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Privacy Perils of Open Data and Data Sharing: A Case
Study of Taiwan's Open Data Policy and Practices
Ching-Yi Liu†, Wei-Ping Li††, & Yun-Pu Tu†††
Abstract: Governments and private sector players have hopped on the
open data train in the past few years. Both the governments and civil society in
Taiwan are exploring the opportunities provided by the data stored in public and
private sectors. While they have been enjoying the benefits of the sharing and
flowing of data among various databases, the government and some players in
the private sectors have also posed tremendous privacy challenges by
inappropriately gathering and processing personal data. The amended Personal
Data Protection Act was originally enacted as a regulatory mechanism to protect
personal data and create economic benefits via enhancing the uses of public and
private sector data. In reality, the Act has instead resulted in harm to Taiwan’s
data privacy situation in this big data era. This article begins with an overview
of the Taiwan’s open data policy history and its current practices. Next, the
article analyzes cases in which the data sharing practices between different
sectors have given rise to privacy controversies, with a particular focus on 2020,
when Taiwan used data surveillance in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Finally, this article flags problems related to an open data system, including the
protection of sensitive data, de-identification, the right to consent and opt-out,
and the ambiguity of “public interest,” and concludes by proposing a feasible
architecture for the implementation of a more sensible open data system with
privacy-enhancing characteristics.
Cite as: Ching-Yi Liu et al., Privacy Perils of Open Data and Data
Sharing: A Case Study of Taiwan's Open Data Policy and Practices, 30 WASH.
INT’L L.J. 545 (2021).

INTRODUCTION
Issues surrounding big data, artificial intelligence, and
data privacy, are among the most popular topics in today’s privacy
law scholarship.1 For example, the Special Rapporteur on the right
†
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†††
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1
See, e.g., JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF (2012);
Michael Froomkin & Zak Colangelo, Privacy as Safety, 95 WASH. L. REV. 141 (2020);
Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (2006); Harry Surden,
Structural Rights in Privacy, 60 SMU L. REV. 1605 (2007). For discussion of various data
privacy issues, see, e.g., Ifeoma Ajunwa et al., Limitless Worker Surveillance,
106 S. CAL. L. REV. 735 (2017); Lothar Determann, Healthy Data Protection,
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to privacy by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights (OHCHR) has discussed many of these issues
in detail.2 Privacy, a primary fundamental human right recognized
by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), is
the right to control one’s personal information by deciding how
their information is collected and used.3 For individuals, a breach
of personal information poses a potential threat to identity theft.4
For organizations, the unauthorized collection and inadequate
processing of personal data may create a tremendous risk of
lawsuits or penalties. For example, the California Consumer
Privacy Act (CCPA) in the U.S. grants data subjects a private right
of action if a company that keeps subjects’ unencrypted and
unredacted information fails to implement reasonable procedures
to protect the subjects’ personal information, and a breach results
from the company’s failure.5
There are multiple regulatory restrictions and legal
frameworks in place for safeguarding the right to data privacy. The
European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)6
and the United States’ Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) 7 and Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
(GLB)8 are perhaps the regulations that have attracted most of the
26 MICH. TECH. L. REV. 229 (2020); Lilian Edwards, Privacy, Security and Data
Protection in Smart Cities; A Critical EU Law Perspective, 2 EUR. DATA PROT. L. REV. 28
(2016); ANDREW GUTHRIE FERGUSON, THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING: SURVEILLANCE,
RACE, AND THE FUTURE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT (2017); Erin Murphy & Jun H. Tong, The
Racial Composition of Forensic DNA Databases, 108 CAL. L. REV. 1847 (2020); Frank
Pasquale, Data-Informed Duties in AI Development, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1917 (2019);
Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934 (2013).
2
See generally Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy, OHCHR,
https://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/privacy/sr/pages/srprivacyindex.aspx (last visited April
11, 2021).
3
Clément Perarnaud, Privacy and Data Protection, GIP DIGITAL WATCH,
https://dig.watch/issues/privacy-and-data-protection (last visited April 11, 2021).
4
Ryan Brooks, Data Privacy Trends, Issues and Concerns, NETWRIX (April 8,
2021), https://blog.netwrix.com/2019/11/05/data-privacy-trends-issues-and-concerns-for2020/; CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.150(a)(1) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 1 of 2020 Reg. Sess.).
5
Id.
6
See generally General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), 2016 O.J. (L119),
https://gdpr-info.eu/ (last visited April 11, 2021).
7
See generally Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA),
Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996).
8
See generally Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLB), 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809,
15 U.S.C. §§ 6821–6827 (1999).
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attention over the past few years.9 More recently, novel but thorny
issues arising out of the need to manage the COVID-19 pandemic
have challenged data governance and regulation around the
world. 10 The pandemic created a growing urgency for
governments to track and surveil their citizens in the name of
public health, which in turn impacted individual autonomy and the
right to data privacy.11
The past decade preceding the pandemic also witnessed a
wave of open data initiatives. 12 More governments and
corporations embraced the idea of “open data,” which has been
described as “accessible public data that people, companies, and
organizations can use to launch new ventures, analyze patterns
and trends, make data-driven decisions, and solve complex
problems.”13 By adopting open data initiatives, governments and
corporations have released raw data sets that are collected, stored,
and buried deep in databases to the public.14 Open data initiatives
have rendered government records more accessible to the public,
encouraged technological innovation, increased economic
9
See Jonathan Keane, From California to Brazil: Europe’s Privacy Laws Have
Created a Recipe for the World, CNBC (Apr. 8, 2021 1:32 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/04/08/from-california-to-brazil-gdpr-has-created-recipe-forthe-world.html; Leonard Wills, A Very Brief Introduction on Cybersecurity
Regulations/Standards: Part 1, AM. BAR ASS’N (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.americanba
r.org/groups/litigation/committees/minority-trial-lawyer/practice/2020/a-very-briefintroduction-on-cybersecurity-regulations-standards-1/.
10
See generally Chuan-Feng Wu, COVID-19 and Democratic Governance in
Taiwan: Challenges and Opportunities, U.S.-ASIA LAW INSTITUTE (Jan. 28, 2021),
https://usali.org/usali-perspectives-blog/covid-19-and-democratic-governance-in-taiwanchallenges-and-opportunities.
11
Joseph A. Cannataci (The Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy),
Preliminary Evaluation of the Privacy Dimensions of the Coronavirus Disease (COVID19) Pandemic Report, U.N. Doc. A/75/147 (2020).
12
See e.g., White House Open Data Initiatives, OBAMA WHITE HOUSE
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/open (last visited Nov.18, 2020); State of New York
Open Data, STATE OF NEW YORK (2020), https://data.ny.gov/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2020);
City of Chicago Data Portal, CITY OF CHICAGO (2020), https://data.cityofchicago.org/ (last
visited Nov. 18, 2020); see also Amy Harmon, As Public Records Go Online, Some Say
They're Too Public, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/08/24/ny
region/as-public-records-go-online-some-say-they-re-too-public.html; Jan Whittington et
al., Push, Pull, and Spill: A Transdisciplinary Case Study in Municipal Open Government,
30 BERKELEY TECH. & L.J. 1899, 1913 (2015).
13
JOEL GURIN, OPEN DATA NOW: THE SECRET TO HOT STARTUPS, SMART
INVESTING, SAVVY MARKETING, AND FAST INNOVATION 9 (2014).
14
See, e.g., Markus Perkmann & Henri Schildt, Open Data Partnerships Between
Firms and Universities: The Role of Boundary Organizations, 44 RSCH. POL’Y 1133,
1134–35 (2015).
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development, and motivated civic engagement. 15 However, the
open data initiatives have also received criticism. Some critics
question whether this data use is appropriate and whether a single
reckless act could cost data subjects’ privacy interests, for instance,
cases have shown that individuals still can be identified by
combining de-identified heath records and voter registration
records.16 Privacy interests must be considered when making open
data policies. A comprehensive data protection program is the key
to fulfilling promises that open data advocates have envisioned.
Although “the right to privacy” is not enumerated in
Taiwan’s Constitution, the Constitutional Court of Taiwan has
long recognized the right to privacy as an indispensable
fundamental right and thus protected under Article 22 of the
Constitution for purposes of preserving human dignity.17 Recent
data privacy controversies in Taiwan exemplify the need for a
more thoughtful and comprehensive privacy protection
mechanism. The Taiwanese government and civil society have
explored the opportunities provided by data stored in both the
public and the private sectors since 2009.18 While the sharing and
flowing of data among various benefits has created numerous
benefits, 19 there are some downsides. Some government and
15
See generally BEN GREEN, THE SMART ENOUGH CITY (2019) (ebook); BEYOND
TRANSPARENCY (Brett Goldstein et al. eds., 2013); BETH SIMONE NOVECK, SMART
CITIZENS, SMARTER STATES (2015); SMART CITIES CYBERSECURITY AND PRIVACY (Danda
B. Rawat & Kayhan Zrar Ghafoor eds., 2018); HOW SMART IS YOUR CITY?
TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION, ETHICS AND INCLUSIVENESS (Maria Isabel Aldinhas
Ferreira ed., 2020).
16
See, e.g., BEN GREEN ET AL., OPEN DATA PRIVACY 3 (2017); Arthur P.B.
Laudrain, Smart-City Technologies, Government Surveillance & Privacy, Assessing the
Potential for Chilling Effects and Existing Safeguards in the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 3 (Aug. 7, 2019) (unpublished
article) (on file with Leiden University Grotius Center for International Legal Studies); see
also Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic Stutzman, The Case for Online Obscurity, 101 CAL. L.
REV. 1, 16 (2013); Ben Green et al., Open Data Privacy: A Risk-benefit, Process-oriented
Approach to Sharing and Protecting Municipal Data, BERKMAN KLEIN CENTER FOR
INTERNET & SOCIETY (2017), https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/30340010/Ope
nDataPrivacy.pdf
17
See Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 603 (Sept. 28, 2005) (Taiwan).
18
See, e.g., MEI-CHUN LEE & PO-YU TSENG, OPEN CULTURE FOUNDATION,
TAIWAN 2014–2016 OPEN GOVERNMENT REPORT 2 (2017),
https://opengovreport.ocf.tw/assets/pdf/report-en.pdf.
19
For example, during a disastrous dust explosion happened in Taipei in 2015, the
Taipei municipal government released the data of casualties and aid shortage to the public.
With the shared data, the tech community and the government collaborated to establish
systems to allocate and coordinate aid resources. Id. at 56.
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private sector actors intend to capitalize on this data usage and
pose tremendous privacy risks to Taiwanese people by
inappropriately gathering and processing personal data. The
Personal Data Protection Act (PDPA) was originally enacted to
serve as the ultimate regulatory foundation for protecting personal
data in 1995, when it passed as the Computer-Processed Personal
Data Protection Act.20 However, the PDPA has not only failed to
sufficiently protect personal data, but it has in fact worsened the
data privacy landscape in Taiwan. Further, the PDPA’s articles are
outdated, having not been substantially amended since 2015. 21
The law is also lacking several important privacy protection
concepts, such as the right to opt-out, the right to be forgotten, and
data portability, all of which are concerns internationally.22
This article focuses on open data policy’s development in
Taiwan and provides a critical analysis of the potential downsides
to its privacy scheme. Part I begins with an overview of taiwan’s
open data initiatives and current practices. Part II analyzes specific
case studies where the data sharing practices in different sectors
have resulted in privacy erosions. Part III concludes with feasible
solutions for implementing a more sensible open data system with
privacy-enhancing characteristics.
II. OPEN DATA AND PRIVACY PROTECTIONS IN TAIWAN
A. The History of Open Data and the PDPA
In 2005, the Legislative Yuan, Taiwan’s legislative body,
passed the Freedom of Government Information Law (FOGIL),
20
See GRAHAM GREENLEAF, ASIAN DATA PRIVACY LAWS: TRADE AND HUMAN
RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE 162, 171–72 (2014).
21
GeRen ZihLiao BaoHuFa (個人資料保護法) [Personal Data Protection Act]
(promulgated by NAT’L DEV. COUNCIL, Aug. 11, 1995, effective Aug. 11, 1995) (Taiwan)
(the amendment 2019 only amend the relevant matters set out in § 53 and § 55 pertaining
to “The Ministry of Justice” shall be handled by “The National Development Council” as
governing body).
22
See, e.g., Oskar Josef Gstrein, Right to be Forgotten: European Data
Imperialism, National Privilege, or Universal Human Right?, 13 REV. OF EUR.
ADMIN. L. 125, 128 (2020); Chang Chih-Wei, Remember, Forget or Be Forgotten on the
Internet: Review the Personal Data Protection in the Digital Age Based on the Decision of
the Court of Justice of the European Union Regarding the Right to be
Forgotten,148 CHENGCHI L. REV. 1, 5 (2017); see also Gabriel Nicholas, Taking It with
You: Platform Barriers to Entry and the Limits of Data Portability 1–5 (Mar. 6, 2020)
(unpublished article) (on file with Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law
Review).
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which serves as the legal basis for citizens who want to request
information from the government. 23 However, the open data
initiative did not take root until 2009, when several groups in civil
society promoted open data policies. For example, the Association
of Digital Culture brought society’s attention to the power of data
during a deadly typhoon disaster in August 2009. 24 The
Association collected information released by the government to
coordinate rescue missions, which helped to rapidly allocate
resources to people in need.25
The demand for open data in Taiwan continued to grow
and attracted more people to explore the potential of data. For
example, the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster 26 spurred
Taiwanese concerns about the safety of Taiwan’s nuclear power
plants and electricity supply.27 Consequently, a group of hackers
and experts who possessed electricity generation data began
investigating Taiwan’s electricity issues and released data to the
public that had long been kept in the Taiwan Power Company’s
private database.28
Meanwhile, some Taiwanese government ministers
attempted to map out strategies and formulate policies of open
government and open data after witnessing the efforts of civil
groups and open government initiatives in other countries,
particularly the United States.29 In November 2012, the Executive
Yuan, the executive branch of Taiwan’s central government,

23
See Taiwan Freedom of Information Overview, FREEDOMINFO.ORG,
http://www.freedominfo.org/regions/east-asia/taiwan/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2020).
24
Li Bo-Yu (李 柏 昱), FangZai 2.0 Jhuanti (Wu): TsShun JhuKon
GuanMinHeZhuoLi [防災 2.0 專題(五): 資訊志工 官民合作力] [Disaster Prevention 2.0:
Information Volunteers; The Government and the People Work Together], PANSCI (2013),
https://pansci.asia/archives/44612.
25
Id.
26
In March 2011, an earthquake caused a nuclear reactor meltdown in the
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in Japan. See generally RICHARD J. SAMUELS,
3.11: DISASTER AND CHANGE IN JAPAN (2013).
27
Ko Shu-Ling, Taiwan, Japan Share Atomic Power Dilemma, THE JAPAN TIMES
(Apr. 11, 2012), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/04/11/national/taiwan-japanshare-atomic-power-dilemma/.
28
See Jonathan Stray, How Does a Country Get to Open Data? What Taiwan Can
Teach Us About the Evolution of Access, NIEMAN LAB (April 10, 2013, 10:00 AM),
http://www.niemanlab.org/2013/04/how-does-a-country-get-to-open-data-what-taiwancan-teach-us-about-the-evolution-of-access/.
29
LEE & TSENG, supra note 18, at 7.
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passed a resolution to promote open data nationwide. 30 The
resolution was subsequently followed by further regulations and
guidelines, including the “Open Government Data Operating
Principle for Agencies of the Executive Yuan,” and the
“Regulations for the Use of the Government Open Data
Platform.” 31 The official open data portal website, 32 which
deposits all available data from Taiwanese central and local
governments, has been online since April 2013.33 On this website,
central and local governments as well as individuals and private
sector groups are able to share data sets.34 As of November 20,
2020, there are 47,747 datasets available on this website. 35 In
addition, the central government has encouraged companies to
utilize government data and engage in projects that promote the
public interest. 36 The “Google Taiwan Natural Disaster
Management Plan” is a noticeable public interest promoting
project. As suggested by the name of the plan, it is a Google
product that uses data from different departments of the central
government to map out any natural disasters on the island in a realtime manner.37
Some Taiwanese local governments that witnessed this
open data trend responded by creating their own open data

30
The Premier and government ministers at this meeting recognized the
importance of being transparent with government information and decided to formulate
regulations on opening data to the public; Minutes of the 3322nd Executive Yuan Meeting
Resolution (Nov. 8, 2011), https://www.ey.gov.tw/Page/4EC2394BE4EE9DD0/1cd200d2f113-4932-a993-8811bbc3d6fd .
31
XingZhengYuan Ji SuoShu GeJiJ Guan JhengFu ZihLiao KaiFang ZuoYeh
YuanZe (行政院及所屬各級機關政府資料開放作業原則) [Open Government Data
Operating Principle for Agencies of the Executive Yuan] (promulgated on Feb. 23, 2013);
JhengFu ZihLiao KaiFang PingTai ZihLiao ShihYong GueiFan (政府資料開放平臺資料
使用規範) [Regulations for the Use of the Government Open Data Platform].
32
See DATA.GOV.TW, https://data.gov.tw/.
33
See generally Shian Ging (項靖), KaiFang ZihLiao JiChiDuei JhengFu JhihLi
Yu GeRenYinSih YingSiang Jhih YanJiou (開放資料及其對政府治理與個人隱私影響之
研究) [The Influence of Open Data on Government Governance and Individual Privacy],
TAIWAN E-GOVERNANCE RESEARCH CENTER (2015).
34
See About Us, OPEN DATA PLATFORM, https://data.gov.tw/en/about (last visited
May 28, 2021).
35
See DATA.GOV.TW, supra note 32.
36
See, e.g., Jhuang Yin-Jyh, Open Government Data Strategy and Outlook in
Taiwan, 14 ARCHIVE Q. 22, 24.
37
See Google Taiwan Disaster Information Platform, DATA.GOV.TW,
http://data.gov.tw/node/8170 (last visited Feb. 20, 2020).
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initiatives.38 Taipei City Government was the first among local
government to make its data accessible on a local data platform,
“Data.Taipei.” 39 On “Data.Taipei,” the Taipei City Government
outlines the goals of the website, including to provide citizens
easier access to government data, to enhance the transparency and
efficiency of the city government, and to promote the data’s valueadded application. 40 Other local governments, including New
Taipei City, Taichung, Tainan, Kaohsiung, and Taoyuan, have also
begun building their own open data websites. 41 In 2018, the
governments from these six special municipalities became the first
Asian cities to sign the Open Data Charter (ODC). 42 Local
associations have taken actions to facilitate open data initiatives
too. In 2013, the Taipei Computer Association established the
Open Data Alliance, an example of nongovernmental advocacy
for open data.43
The Executive Yuan named 2015 as the first year to
actively promote open data and big data usage.44 That same year,
Taiwan also received recognition as the top open data country on
the Global Open Data Index, 45 which greatly emphasized
Taiwan’s progress in the field of open data at the central and local
38
See Nieh Ting-Yu (聶廷宇), YiQiLai WaJue YinCang zai ZiLiao zhong di XunXi
(一起來挖掘隱藏在資料中的訊息) [Let’s Excavate the Information Hidden in the Data
Together], GOVERNMENT RESEARCH BULLETIN (Apr. 8, 2019), https://www.grb.gov.tw/s
earch/report/12991480.
39
Shian, supra note 33.
40
See DATA.TAIPEI, https://data.taipei/#/about/aboutus.
41
See Yang Tung-Mou & Wu Yi-Jung, The Maturity Assessment of the Recent
Open Data Development in the Context of Taiwan E-Government, 56 J. OF EDUC. MEDIA
& LIB. SCI. 7, 30 (2019).
42
See Taiwan City’s Open Data Grabs First Place in Asia, NATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL (July 31, 2017), https://www.ndc.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n
=114AAE178CD95D4C&sms=DF717169EA26F1A3&s=BEFA5CB8BDC7E2A6%E3%
80%82.
43
See Su Wen-Bin (蘇文彬), GuoNei ChengLi Open Data LianMeng TueiDong
KaiFang ZihLiao YingYong FaJhan (國內成立 Open Data 聯盟推動開放資料應用發展)
[The Open Data Alliance Was Established in Taiwan to Promote the Development of Open
Data Applications], ITHOME (Sept. 14, 2013), https://www.ithome.com.tw/node/82633 .
44
Zhonghua Minguo Xingzeng Yuan [Executive Yuan of R.O.C.], MaoKuei:
CiDong Open Data ShenHua YingYong YuanNian JiaSu ShihChu JengFu ZihLiao (毛揆：
啟動 Open Data 深化應用元年 加速釋出政府資料) [Premier Mao: Launching the First
Year of Deepening the Application of Open Data to Accelerate the Release of Government
Data], EXECUTIVE YUAN (Feb. 5, 2015), https://www.ey.gov.tw/Page/9277F759E41CCD
91/bb1dd1b5-f098-4ed0-8e88-8ab2e9764a03.
45
See generally LEE & TSENG, supra note 18, at 29.
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government levels. To accelerate the release of data, the Executive
Yuan required every department to establish a consulting
committee dedicated to open data matters.46 By mid-2015, more
than 30 committees were implemented throughout most of the
departments under the Executive Yuan. 47 The committees are
composed of members from both the government and private
sectors, and they are responsible for reviewing the data releasing
process in each department.48
However, discussions about open data policies among
government and private sector participants still failed to include a
comprehensive privacy protection framework. 49 Nor were any
sufficiently detailed instructions or regulatory efforts put forth to
protect personal data during the process of data disclosure. 50
Although there have been governmental efforts to incorporate
personal privacy guidelines, 51 the existing Open Government
Data Principle and pertinent administrative regulations only
provide government agencies with general guidelines when
government employees use and process data. Whenever
controversies about personal data protection arise, government
agencies mostly rely on the PDPA to justify their data gathering,
processing, and reuse practices. 52 Unfortunately, the PDPA
remains a regulatory regime with multiple flaws.

46
Advanced Strategies for Government Open Data Action, NATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL, http://www.ndc.gov.tw/Content_List.aspx?n=B2A92523DCC1
2607.
47
Global Open Data Index 2015 – Taiwan Insight, OPEN KNOWLEDGE
FOUNDATION (Dec. 16, 2015), https://blog.okfn.org/2015/12/16/global-open-data-index2015-taiwan-index/
48
DATA.TAIPEI, supra note 40.
49
See e.g., LEE & TSENG, supra note 18, at 7–8.
50
CHEN SHUN-LIN (陳舜伶) ET AL., Cang Zhi yu Min: KaiFang ZhengFu ZiLiao
de YuanZe yu XianKuang(藏 智 於 民: 開 放 政 府 資 料 的 原 則 與 現 況) [Empowering
Citizens with Data: An Open Government Data Handbook] 8–9 (Research Center for
Information Technology at Academia Sinica Jan. 2013).
51
The “Open Government Data Operating Principle for Agencies of the Executive
Yuan” (the primary guidelines for government agency, amended in 2019) provides an
example. There are only two items in the Principle related to privacy and personal data:
Point 5 & Point 15. It also suggests that the PDPA and the Cyber Security Management Act
are the only laws necessary to comply with when processing personal data.
52
See generally GeZiFa Wen yu Da (個資法問與答) [Personal Information
Questions and Answers], NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL, https://pipa.ndc.gov.tw/Ne
ws.aspx?n=7D3602579D2BF23F&sms=2F28806F8A42AE16 (last visited Apr. 11, 2021).
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The PDPA was originally enacted as the ComputerProcessed Personal Data Protection Law (CPPDPL), in 1995.53 To
help garner support from the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, the Legislative Yuan enacted the CPPDPL to guarantee to
the World Trade Organization that Taiwan would provide
appropriate privacy protection for personal data. 54 As its name
suggests, the CPPDPL only applied to data processed by
computers.55 Therefore, this law did not require data collectors or
processors to specify why they were collecting, processing, or
using data, nor did it ask data collectors or processors to deidentify the data.56 The CPPDPL was eventually replaced by the
PDPA in 2010, where the legislators vowed to grant greater rights
to individuals to control their own personal data and require data
collectors and processors to provide more protections.57
Nevertheless, the insufficient data privacy protection
guidelines issued by the Executive Yuan and the PDPA have
resulted in several controversies that have further increased legal
uncertainties. 58 These uncertainties cause concerns for both
citizens who may be uncomfortable about their personal data
being disclosed and for civil servants responsible for handling
personal data daily.59 A 2017 survey showed that more than 80%
53
See Robin Winkler, Computer-Processed Personal Data Protection Act,
WINKLER PARTNERS (Sept. 28, 2007), http://www.winklerpartners.com/?p=987.
54
See generally Liu Zuo-Kuo (劉佐國), WoGuo GeRen ZiLiao YinSi QuanYi zhi
BaoHu—Lun “DianNao ChuLi GeRen ZiLiao BaoHu Fa” zhi LiFa yu XiuFa GuoCheng
(我國個人資料隱私權益之保護—論「電腦處理個人資料保護法」之立法與修法過
程) [The Protection of the Interests of Data Privacy in Taiwan—The Course of the
Legislation and the Amendment of the Personal Information Protection Act], TAIPEI BAR J.
42, 44–51 (2005).
55
See Chen-Hung Chang, Eyes on the Road Program in Taiwan―Information
Privacy Issues under the Taiwan Personal Data Protection Act, 31 MARSHALL J. INFO.
TECH. & PRIVACY L. 145, 151 (2014).
56
See generally Yung-Hua Kuo & Po-Liang Chen, Identity Laws and Privacy
Protection in a Modern State: The Legal History Concerning Personal Information in
Taiwan (1895–2015), 25 WASH. INT'L L.J. 223, 245 (2016).
57
Chang, supra note 55, at 152.
58
See generally Shian, supra note 33.
59
See Liao Zhou-Peng et al., (廖洲棚、廖興中、黃心怡), Kaifang Jhengfu
Fuwu Ce lyue Yansi Diaocha: Jhengfu Zihliao Kaifang Yingyong Moshih Pinggu Yu
Minjhong Canyu Gonggong Jhengce Yiyuan Diaocha (開放政府服務策略研析調查：政
府資料開放應用模式評估與民眾參與公共政策意願調查) [Research and Analysis on
Open Government Service Strategy: Evaluation of Government Data Open Application
model and Public Participation in Public Policy Willingness Survey], NAT’L DEV.
COUNCIL (2017), https://www.teg.org.tw/files/research/.
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of civil servants believe the current law is insufficient for handling
open data duties, while private citizens agree that it is reasonable
for the government to restrict the usage of open data to protect
privacy.60
For years, Taiwan’s civil society and government have
endeavored to excavate data stored within the government and
private companies and tried to capitalize on the potential of such
data. 61 Nevertheless, a comprehensive privacy protection
framework remains absent from the process of opening data. 62
PDPA flaws discussed below demonstrate how it may fail to
protect citizens’ privacy when data subjects’ information is being
shared.
B. Key Controversies Raised by the PDPA
1. The protection of sensitive data. — The PDPA provides
more data protections than any previous Taiwanese legislation.
For example, the PDPA extends privacy protection to all data,
whether it is stored in computers, in print, or processed in both
government agencies and private sectors.63 Moreover, the PDPA
mandates that under most circumstances, data collectors should
inform data subjects of collection purposes and obtain consent
from the subjects.64 The law also distinguishes between “general
personal data” versus “sensitive personal data,” which includes
medical records, healthcare data, genetics information, sex life
data, physical examination reports, and criminal records. 65
Nevertheless, because Article 6 of the PDPA required stronger
protection of “sensitive personal data” and other strict regulations,
it faced fierce opposition from the private sector because “it would
cause tremendous hardships for corporations to abide by the law”

60
The survey question is: “on a scale from 1[strongly disagree] to 5[strongly
agree], indicate how you agree or disagree with the following statement: To protect privacy,
it is reasonable that the government imposes restrictions on data accessibility.” The average
score of the surveyed participants was 3.95. Id. at 198.
61
See LEE & TSENG, supra note 18, at 31–52 (noting Taiwan’s open data cases).
62
See, e.g., Shian, supra note 33; see also Open Culture Foundation, supra
note 18.
63
GenRen ZiLiao BaoHuFa (個人資料保護法) [Personal Data Protection Act],
ch. I, art. 2.
64
Id. arts. 6–7.
65
Id. art. 6.
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should it be implemented.66 As a consequence, this contentious
Article and the other articles related to its enforcement were
suspended, leading to the amendments in 2015.67
Taiwan’s Ministry of Justice claimed that the purpose of
the 2015 amendment was to “keep [the law] up with the current
social circumstances.”68 For instance, under the amended PDPA,
“written consent” is no longer required for the collection of
personal data, unless it is sensitive data.69 This means that even
implicit words of consent, verbal or written, can meet the PDPA
consent requirement. 70 The Ministry of Justice reasoned that
relaxing the consent requirements could ease the potential
administrative burdens on government agencies and save costs for
private sector actors. 71 Civil society groups such as Taiwan
Association of Human Rights disagreed and criticized this clause
and other aspects of the amendment, arguing that the Ministry of
Justice was trading individuals’ rights to privacy for convenience
and benefits for data collectors and processors. 72 The amended
PDPA not only fell short of many individuals’ expectations of
closing the loopholes in data protection laws, but it also increased
risks of privacy violations. The following scenarios exemplify

See Chang Jin-Hao (張景皓), GeZihSiouFa DaZhueiZong SanJenYi TiaoWen
RenDai LiFaYuan ShenYi (個資修法大追蹤 3 爭議條文仍待立法院審議) [Tracking the
Amendment of the Personal Data Protection Act: Three Controversial Articles Are Waiting
to Be Deliberated by the Legislative Yuan], ITHOME (Sept. 30, 2013), https://www.ithome
.com.tw/node/82912.
67
Huang Yen-Fen (黃 彥 棻), FaWuBu: GeZihFa SiouJhengAn ZueiKuai
MingNian San Yue ShihShih (法務部：個資法修正案最快明年三月實施) [Ministry of
Justice: The Amended Personal Information Protection Act Will Be Effective in March at
the Earliest], ITHOME (Dec. 18, 2015), http://www.ithome.com.tw/news/101614; Lu YiRong, The Ministry of Justice "reverses" Personal Information May No Longer be
Protected, JOURNALIST (June 25, 2020), https://www.new7.com.tw/NewsView.aspx?t=&i
=TXT201506171714196B2.
68
Huang, supra note 67.
69
GenRen ZiLiao BaoHuFa (個人資料保護法) [Personal Data Protection Act],
ch. I, art. 7.
70
Id.
71
FaWuBu dui GenRen ZiLiao BaoHuFa BuFen TiaoWen XiuZheng ShuoMing
(法務部對個人資料保護法部分條文修正說明) [Ministry of Justice Explanation to The
Amendments of The Personal Information Protection Act], art. 7 (2015).
72
See Chiou Wen-Tsong (邱 文 聰), Chihluo de Guomin yu Duntianrudi
Wusuobuneng de Jhengfu (赤 裸 的 國 民 與 遁 天 入 地 無 所 不 能 的 政 府) [The Naked
Citizens and the Omnipotent Government that Could Traverse Across the Sky as Well as
the Earth], LIBERTY TIMES (Dec. 21, 2015), http://talk.ltn.com.tw/article/paper/942381.
66
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how the amendments may put data subjects at privacy risks in
open data cases.
2. De-identification. — Although the purpose of the
PDPA is to protect personal data, the law only addresses the issue
of de-identification in a general way. De-identification refers to
the process used to prevent someone's personal identity from
being revealed.73 The 2015 amendment merely requires that when
government agencies or academic institutions reuse data for any
purpose other than that for which it was originally collected, they
must de-identify the data so that the information will not lead to
the identification of a specific data subject. 74 The PDPA’s
Enforcement Rules promulgated under the Ministry of Justice
further elaborated on the de-identification process, stating that the
“data may not lead to the identification of a specific data
subject.” 75 The Enforcement Rules then provide that
deidentification “shall mean the personal data [be] replaced with
codes” and a data subject’s name shall be “deleted … partially
concealed, or processed via other means to the extent that the data
subject may not be directly identified.”76
However, these enforcement rules do not provide any
guidance regarding the extent to which the data should be
deidentified or how much personal information should be
removed. This lack of guidance gives rise to thorny questions. For
instance, is the de-identification considered strong enough if the
data subject cannot be identified at the first glance of the
information? Should the de-identification be irreversible so that
the data subjects cannot be identified if their data is combined with
other data sets?
Another issue raised by the PDPA concerning deidentification is the lack of guidance denoting who bears the
responsibility of ensuring the process is done successfully. The
relevant provisions discussing de-identification state that the
73
See Joseph Jerome, De-Identification Should Be Relevant to a Privacy Law, But
Not an Automatic Get-Out-of-Jail-Free Card, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND
TECHNOLOGY (Apr. 1, 2019), https://cdt.org/insights/de-identification-should-berelevant-to-a-privacy-law-but-not-an-automatic-get-out-of-jail-free-card/.
74
GenRen ZiLiao BaoHuFa (個人資料保護法) [Personal Data Protection Act]
ch. I, arts. 6, 9; ch. II, art. 16; ch. III, arts. 19–20.
75
GenRen ZiLiao BaoHuFa ShiXing XiZe (個 人 資 料 保 護 法 施 行 細 則)
[Enforcement Rules of the Personal Data Protection Act] art. 17.
76
Id.
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information “may not lead to the identification of a specific data
subject” after its processing by the provider or from the disclosure
by the collector,77 but no direction is given on who must complete
this step. This ambiguity could result in further privacy disputes
as both providers and collectors could theoretically shed the
burden of de-identification under the statutory language. Without
a clear understanding about whose responsibility it is to deidentify the data, the actual de-identifying process could be
delayed and result in further risks of privacy violations.
3. The right to consent and opt-out. — Informed consent
is an important mechanism for individuals to control the flow of
their information. The 2010 PDPA amendment required data
collectors to obtain written consent from data subjects under
general circumstances. 78 However, to ease the burden on data
collectors, particularly in situations where there are large volumes
of data, the 2015 amendment lifted this requirement for written
consent, except when collecting sensitive personal data. 79 Now,
when dealing with non-sensitive personal data, data collectors or
providers do not need to obtain “written consents.” 80 In other
words, verbal consent, not written consent, is sufficient under
these circumstances.81
Data collectors or provides do not need to obtain any form
of consent in other conditions, such as collecting data for a public
interest purpose, academic research, or assisting government
agencies. 82 From a data collectors’ perspective, the 2015
amendment has removed the hurdle of obtaining consent when a
large number of data subjects are involved, which is true in most
open data initiatives. Data subjects, on the other hand, have gained

77
GenRen ZiLiao BaoHuFa (個人資料保護法) [Personal Data Protection Act]
ch. I, arts. 6, 9; ch. II, art. 16; ch. III, arts. 19–20.
78
See Huang Yen-Fen (黃彥棻), GeZihFa XiZe ChLu, GaoZhi yu ShuMian TonYi
2 DaxianZhi FangKuan (個資法細則出爐，告知與書面同意 2 大限制放寬) [The
Released Rules of PDPA, Relax the 2 Limitation to Inform and the Written Consent],
ITHOME (Nov. 4, 2011), https://www.ithome.com.tw/node/70655.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
GenRen ZiLiao BaoHuFa (個人資料保護法) [Personal Data Protection Act]
ch. I, art. 7; ch. II, arts. 15–16; ch. III, arts. 19–20.
82
GenRen ZiLiao BaoHuFa (個人資料保護法) [Personal Data Protection Act]
ch. I, art. 6; ch. II, art. 16; ch. III, arts. 19, 20.
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little while simultaneously losing the right to refuse their data
from being used without clear consent.
Still worse, according to the PDPA, data subjects can
only request their information be deleted or discontinued from
processing or use when the specific purpose of data collection no
longer exists or the dataset period expires. Except for the above
situations, data subjects cannot choose to “opt-out” of the
databases or programs. 83
4. The ambiguity of “public interest.” — The term “public
interest” appears repeatedly throughout the PDPA and serves as an
exception for data collectors or providers to avoid certain legal
obligations. For example, the PDPA mandates that a government
agency shall only use personal data for the specific purpose of
collection and within the necessary scope of its duty.84 However,
Article 16 allows government agencies to use data for purposes
other than the original purpose behind collecting the data if the use
is for “public interest.”85 Other provisions in the PDPA also allow
“public interest” exemptions, such as data uses for news reporting
purposes.86 However, no explicit definition of “public interest” is
given.
Without a workable definition of “public interest,” there
is no limit to the number of exemptions that could be invoked.
Throughout Taiwan’s history, the government has often used
“maintaining social order” and “promoting administrative
efficiency” as justifications for policing its people.87 Therefore,
the risk of data collectors or data processors excessively utilizing
this “public interest” exemption may perhaps be even higher.
When the Legislative Yuan passed the PDPA in 2010,
legislators were aware of the possible controversies that might
arise from the undefined term “public interest.”88 However, the
legislators explicitly chose to keep the term undefined and instead
made an “additional resolution” to deal with this issue when

Id. ch. I, art. 11.
Id. ch. II, art. 16.
85
Id.
86
Id. ch. I, arts. 6, 8–9; ch. III, arts. 19–20.
87
See Kuo & Chen, supra note 56, at 259–60 (highlighting the cases in which the
government used “social order” as a basis to sacrifice Taiwanese citizens’ privacy rights).
88
See Huang, supra note 78.
83
84
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passing the law. 89 In the additional resolution, the legislature
asked the Ministry of Justice to define “public interest” in the
Enforcement Rules of the PDPA after consulting experts and
members from civil society. 90 But since then, the Ministry of
Justice has not responded to the request. Consequently, the
government and the courts usually determine that this public
interest requirement has been satisfied if a program is carried out
for public purposes in the public sector, as open data initiatives
are.91 But the data users (in most cases, the government) and the
courts have never carefully analyzed an open data regime to
determine what the public interest at issue is, nor have they
weighed the importance of a claimed public interest against an
individual’s right to privacy.92 Under this current legal framework,
those who employ public interest justifications usually prevail and
individuals’ privacy interests are diminished even further.93
While the Taiwanese is working to support the rapidly
growing data initiatives in the country, the PDPA remains the only
available mechanism to ensure privacy protections. A privacy
protection mechanism with numerous undefined terms and
loopholes as the only avenue for protecting individuals’ data
privacy therefore continues to contribute to the privacy perils of
Taiwan’s open data initiatives.
III. CASE STUDIES
The Electronic Toll Collect System, the Taiwan National
Health Insurance Research Databases, and the COVID-19
surveillance measures recently implemented in Taiwan provide
three examples of the flaws in Taiwan’s open data initiatives.
These case studies highlight the need to adequately address data
89
See Liu Ching-Yi (劉靜怡), BuSuan JinBu de LiFa: “GenRen ZiLiao BaoHuFa”
ChuBu PingXi (不算進步的立法: 『個人資料保護法』初步評析) [A Legislation that is
Not Really Progressive: A Preliminary Comment on Personal Information Protection Law],
153 TAIWAN L. REV. 147, 156–64 (2010).
90
Id.
91
Id. See also Liu Luo-yi (劉珞亦), Jianbao Zihliao Singjheng Susongan Gezih
Baohu yu Jianbao Zihliao Jhihkua ji Guan Lioudong ji Ercihli yong (健保資料行政訴訟
案個資保護與健保資料之跨機關流動及二次利用) [The NHI Personal Data Case, the
NHI Data Flow Between Different Agencies, and the Second Use], ANGLE (Jan. 9, 2020),
http://www.angle.com.tw/ahlr/discovery/post.aspx?ipost=3221.
92
See Liu, supra note 89, at 162.
93
Id.
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privacy concerns when examining open data policies. They also
showcase the urgent need to address the current flaws in the PDPA
– the lack of protection for sensitive data, the lack of a private
right to consent and opt-out, and the ambiguity of the term “public
interest.”
A. Open Data and the Electronic Toll Collect System
The Electronic Toll Collect system illustrates how a
database established by a public-private partnership can be
exploited by a private company, and moreover, how the
government misused data in the name of the ambiguous “public
interests” embedded within the PDPA.94
In 2004, Taiwan’s Ministry of Transportation and
Communication commissioned the Far Eastern Electronic Toll
Collection (Far Eastern), a private corporation, to build the
Electronic Toll Collect system (ETC) on the country’s highways
to replace traditional toll-collecting by workers in toll booths.95
Under the build-operate-transfer contract (BOTC), a type of
public-private-partnership contract, Far Eastern was granted the
right to operate the ETC and the associated data system for twenty
years before returning the right of operation back to the
government.96
Taiwan’s traditional toll booths were all successfully
replaced by the ETC by 2013. 97 The ETC collects and records
information about vehicles driving on the highways, including
time of day, location, distance traveled, and amount paid.98 For the
ETC to gather tolls, many vehicles are equipped with e-Tags,

94
Ho Ming-Syuan (何 明 諠), ShuWei ShiDai de YinSi BianJie: yi JianBao
ZiLiaoKu yu ETC JiaoTong ZiLiaoKu WeiLi (數位時代的隱私邊界：以健保資料庫與
ETC 交通資料庫為例) [The Rights to Privacy in the Digital Age: The Case of the Health
Insurance Research Database and the ETC Traffic Database], 3 TAIWAN HUM. RTS. J. 1
39, 147–49 (2016).
95
FAR EASTERN ELECTRONIC TOLL COLLECTION CO., LTD. (FETC),
http://www.fetc.net.tw/en/OurBusiness/AboutFETC.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2020).
96
Id.
97
See Chang, supra note 55, at 146; see also, ShouFeiYuan ZhuanZhi LiCheng
(收 費 員 轉 置 辦 理 歷 程)
[The Process to Relocate Clerks
in Toll Booths], FREEWAY BUREAU (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.freeway.gov.tw/Publi
sh.aspx?cnid=133.
98
Chang, supra note 55, at 147.
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gadgets that help the ETC identify cars and record data.99 As of
January 2020, 87.94% of all registered vehicles in Taiwan were
equipped with e-Tags.100 The ETC can also scan the license plates
of vehicles that are not equipped with e-Tags,101 which enables the
ETC to record information about all vehicles using the highways,
whether they have e-Tags or not.102
This system has created a comprehensive database of
traffic data and has proved to be incredibly helpful for Taiwanese
government agencies and the private sector.103 However, potential
privacy violations may ensue alongside the beneficial uses of the
data. For example, in 2013, Far Eastern unilaterally instituted a
policy that charged third parties for the e-Tag data they obtained
and used for their own purposes. 104 The policy was severely
criticized by civil society, with many claiming that Far Eastern
was profiting off of selling e-Tags users’ personal data. 105 The
policy was subsequently disapproved by the supervising
government agency, the Freeway Bureau of the Ministry of
99
EIT, eTag ETC Highway Electronic Toll System, ENGLISH IN TAIWAN (Sept.
20, 2020), https://www.englishintaiwan.com/life-in-taiwan/e-tag-highway-electronic-tollsystem-information.
100
In January 2020, Far Eastern claimed that 7,140,000 cars in Taiwan were
equipped with e-Tags. The government record shows that the total number of automobiles
in Taiwan was 8,119,056 in the same month. Thus, the percentage of the cars equipped with
e-Tags was roughly 87.94%. See Jian-Jhih Guo (郭 建志) GuoDao JiCheng ShouFei
LiouJhouNian e-tag ShengJi uTagGO (國道計程收費六周年 e-tag 升級 uTagGO) [After
Six Years of Toll Charges, E-tag Was Upgraded to uTagGO], COM. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2020),
https://ctee.com.tw/livenews/ctee/aj/a08616002020011511282804; The List of Numbers of
Registered Automobiles, MINISTRY OF TRANSP. AND COMM., https://stat.motc.gov.tw/mo
cdb/stmain.jsp?sys=100&funid=a3301 (last visited Nov. 21, 2020).
101
See Lu, supra note 67.
102
Ho, supra note 94, at 147.
103
For example, the National Taxation Bureau of Kaohsiung uses the data on the
number of tolls paid by tour buses to audit the bus companies and determine if they have
honestly filed their taxes. See YouLanCheYe ShenBaXiaoShouE BingWei Yin LuKe
GuanGuang XiangDui ChengZhang GuoShueiJyu Jiang JiaChiang Duei YouLanChe
YehJhe ChaHe (遊覽車業申報銷售額並未因陸客觀光相對成長 國稅局將加強對遊覽
車業者查核) [The Declared Sales of the Tour Bus Industry Did Not Grow Relatively with
the Sightseeing of China Visitors; the Taxation Bureau Will Increase Tax Auditing], LAW
BANK (Sept. 14, 2013), https://www.lawbank.com.tw/news/NewsContent.aspx?NID=113
954.
104
See, e.g., Liwei, Ducyu e-tag Syuhao Kong Sie Gezih (立委︰讀取 e-tag 序號
恐 洩 個 資) [Legislator: Read e-Tag Serial Number for Fear of Leaking Personal
Information], LIBERTY TIMES (May 2, 2013), https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/life/paper/675
481.
105
Id.
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Transportation and Communication (Freeway Bureau) and
eventually retracted by Far Eastern.106
One year later, the Criminal Investigation Bureau
demanded that the Freeway Bureau and Far Eastern hand over all
vehicle travel information, including license plate numbers, travel
time logs, locations, video images, and vehicle data of individuals
who were not criminal suspects.107 Far Eastern initially refused to
turn over the data, turning to the Ministry of Justice for legal
opinions. 108 However, Far Eastern later reached an agreement
with the Criminal Investigation Bureau stating that the
transportation data cannot be reviewed until the Criminal
Investigation Bureau’s requests were approved by prosecutors.109
Far Eastern later released its “Policy to PDPA Protection” that
addresses its relationships and interactions with the government
as “comply[ing] with the PDPA” 110 without clearly indicating
whether any of the data has been or will be handed over to the
Criminal Investigation Bureau.
The government’s utilization of the data stored in the ETC
e-Tag system did not stop at the agreement with Far Eastern. In
2015, as the number of open data initiatives in Taiwan continued
to grow, the Freeway Bureau decided to make all ETC data open
to the public and available online.111 Under this system, anyone
can simply visit the Freeway Bureau’s website and download both
106
Id. Yoguan Meiti Baodao Guodao Dienji Shofei (ETC) Duchu eTag Shuhao
Konshie Gezi Zi Shuomin (有關媒體報導國道電子收費(ETC) 讀取 eTag 序號恐洩個資
之說明) [A Clarification on the News Reporting on the Possible Leak of Personal Data as
A Result from ETC's Reading of eTag], FREEWAY BUREAU (May 7, 2013) https://www.fre
eway.gov.tw/Publish.aspx?cnid=193&p=4429.
107
Liu Si-Yi (劉世怡), Diaoyue Singchejilu Reyi Singshihjyu Shuoming (調閱行
車紀錄惹議 刑事局說明) [Access to Driving History is Controversial, National Police
Agency Explain], CENT. NEWS AGENCY (Jan. 11, 2014), https://www.cna.com.tw/news/fi
rstnews/201401110016.aspx; See also Lu, supra note 67.
108
Lu, supra note 67.
109
Id.
110
Geren Ziliao Baohu Fangshi ji Zhengce Shengming (個人資料保護方式及政
策聲明) [The Policy and Approach to Protect Personal Data], FETC (Mar. 2, 2021)
https://www.fetc.net.tw/UX/UX0901SharePoint/UX090101HtmlContent?processId=UX0
4030103.
111
Wong Yong-Chyuan (翁嫆琄), JhengFu TiGong Etc ZihLiao JhaiBenChiao
BaoJheng WaBuChu GeZih (政府提供 ETC 資料，翟本喬保證挖不出個資) [The
Government Provides ETC Data, Jhai Ben-Chiao Promised that No One Can Dig Personal
Information Out of the Data] (Oct. 5, 2015), NEWTALK, https://newtalk.tw/news/view/20
15-10-05/65305.
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real-time and historical de-identified data on traffic, vehicles’
speed, travel routes, and other related information.112
The Freeway Bureau’s choice to publicize the ETC’s data
unsurprisingly elicited worries and criticisms from civil society.113
First, critics expressed concerns that the disclosure of the data,
though de-identified, would violate the PDPA if the government
did not obtain consent from data subjects. 114 According to the
PDPA, if a government agency uses individuals’ personal data, the
use shall be in accordance with the specific purpose of the data’s
collection.115 The ETC was originally intended to collect highway
tolls. However, data about the all vehicles, including travel time
logs, locations, and images are also collected and stored in the
ETC database.116 One could argue that the data can therefore only
be used for toll-collecting, as this was the original specific purpose
of the data collection, and other uses irrelevant to collecting tolls
on the highway fall outside the scope of the original purpose.117
To counter this argument, the Freeway Bureau contended
that publicizing the ETC data aligns with public interests. 118
Under the exception outlined in Article 16 of the PDPA, an agency
may use data beyond the specific purpose of collection if
necessary to further public interest. 119 The Freeway Bureau
112
See id. See also Points to Note When Using Downloaded Materials, FREEWAY
BUREAU TRAFFIC DATABASE, http://tisvcloud.freeway.gov.tw/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2021).
113
Wo de SingChe JiLu Ni de KaiFang ZihLiao? Zuan GeZihFa LouDong JhengFu
DaLiang KaiFang RenMin ZihLiao (我的行車紀錄，你的開放資料？ 鑽個資法漏洞，
政府大量開放人民資料！) [Is My Traffic Data Your Open Data? The Government Drills
Legal Loopholes to Massively Open Civils' Data], TAIWAN ASSOCIATION FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS (Oct. 23, 2015), https://www.tahr.org.tw/news/1656 [hereinafter Wo de SingChe
JiLu].
114
Id.
115
GenRen ZiLiao BaoHuFa (個人資料保護法) [Personal Data Protection Act]
ch. I, art. 5.
116
See Lu, supra note 67.
117
See Lu Yi-Ron (呂苡榕), WoMen You BuBei Etag KueiKan De QuanLi Ma?
(我們有不被 Etag 窺看的權利嗎?) [Do We Have the Right to be Free From Surveillance
Under Etag?], INITIUM MEDIA (June 14, 2016), https://theinitium.com/article/20160614taiwan-eTag2/.
118
Ho, supra note 94, at 148.
119
GenRen ZiLiao BaoHuFa (個人資料保護法) [Personal Data Protection Act]
ch. II, art. 16 (“[A] government agency shall use personal data only within the necessary
scope of its statutory duties and for the specific purpose of collection; the use of personal
data for another purpose shall be only on any of the following bases: . . . 2. where it is
necessary for ensuring national security or furthering public interest; . . . 5. where it is
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claimed that making the data publicly available online satisfies
this public interest requirement.120 For example, by reading and
downloading the data online, the public can develop a better
understanding of traffic patterns and make more sophisticated
public transportation plans.121
Nevertheless, the Freeway Bureau’s proffered “public
interest” purpose still leaves several issues open. For example, it
will be difficult for the government and the data subjects to ensure
that the data, which can be downloaded for free by anonymous
users all over the world, is used for public good.122 Furthermore,
if a company uses the data to develop a traffic monitoring
application and sells the app for a profit, it seems unlikely that the
company’s use of the data in this for-profit manner should be
construed as a public interest matter.123
Another legal conflict relating to the use of ETC data
arose in 2017 and explicitly showcases the ambiguity of the term
“public interest.”124 The Motor Vehicles Office of the Directorate
General of Highways in HsinChu acquired vehicle images from
the ETC database, identified them, and then issued traffic citations
to vehicles driving on the shoulder of the road.125 One of the issues
in this case was whether the Motor Vehicles Office could use the
data without obtaining consent from the data subjects. The Taiwan
HsinChu District Court ruled that the ETC image data could not
be used as evidence of illegal driving because the Office’s use of
data was unrelated to the original purpose of toll-collecting.126 The
Court further pointed out that without the data subjects’ consent,
necessary for statistics gathering or academic research by a government agency or an
academic institution for public interests; provided that such data, as processed by the data
provider or as disclosed by the data collector, may not lead to the identification of a specific
data subject.”).
120
ETC ZihLiao DueiWai KaiFang jhih ShuoMing (ETC 資料對外開放之說明)
[An Explanation of the Publicizing of ETC Data], FREEWAY BUREAU (Oct. 23, 2015),
https://www.motc.gov.tw/ch/home.jsp?id=14&parentpath=0,2&mcustomize=news_view.j
sp&dataserno=201510230011&aplistdn=ou=data,ou=news,ou=chinese,ou=ap_root,o=mo
tc,c=tw&toolsflag=Y&imgfolder=img%2Fstandard.
121
Id.
122
Ho, supra note 94, at 148.
123
Id.
124
HsinChu DiFang FaYuan (新竹地方法院) [HsinChu District Court], 105 Nian
Su Jaio Zi No. 119 (新竹地方法院 105 年交字第 119 號判決) (2016) (Mar. 13, 2017)
(Taiwan).
125
Id.
126
Id.
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the Office’s use of data would increase the subjects’ privacy
risk.127 As a result, the public interest exception in this case did
not prevail.128
Another concern from critics is the effectiveness of deidentifying e-Tag data. Article 16 of the PDPA allows certain
exceptions when government agencies use data for other purposes
than what it was originally collected for but requires the agencies
to de-identify the data when making them available for secondary
use.129 However, the PDPA fails to clearly indicate whether the
agencies must obtain informed consent from data subjects if the
uses of data will exceed the original purpose of the data
collection. 130 In the traffic database that the Freeway Bureau
opened to the public, the only data removed was license plate
numbers. 131 The Freeway Bureau claimed that removing the
license plate numbers effectively de-identified the data, and thus,
there was no need to obtain consent.132 However, even without
license plate numbers, user identification is still possible given the
amount of data released.133 Information about vehicles’ departure
locations, destinations, and travel times is released. 134 When
traffic is light, one could theoretically identify the vehicles that
use highways by compiling all of this accessible information.135
Furthermore, a person could use the images of a vehicle, the time,
and the location of the vehicle traveling on the highway to surveil
the travel route of the driver.136 Unfortunately, as discussed, there
are no requirements regarding the security level or necessary
thresholds for data de-identification in the PDPA. Therefore,
under this loose regulatory regime, the simple step of removing
vehicles’ license plate numbers might be enough to satisfy the
Id.
Id.
129
GenRen ZiLiao BaoHuFa (個人資料保護法) [Personal Data Protection Act]
ch. II, art. 16 (“[A] government agency shall use personal data only within the necessary
scope of its statutory duties and for the specific purpose of collection.”).
130
See Is My Traffic Data Your Open Data? The Government Drills Legal
Loopholes to Massively Open Civils' Data, supra note 113.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
See The List of Numbers of Registered Automobiles, supra note 100.
134
See Is My Traffic Data Your Open Data? The Government Drills Legal
Loopholes to Massively Open Civils' Data67, supra note 113.
135
Id.
136
Lu, supra note 67.
127
128
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PDPA’s de-identification requirement for using the data without
obtaining consent from data subjects. However, this potential
conclusion could have severe negative ramifications in terms of
privacy protection. Since there is no clear prohibition on data
compiling under these circumstances, critics worry that the data
could be combined with other information and used for
surveillance.137
The above examples highlight not only the imprudent and
insufficient privacy practices of Far Eastern and the Freeway
Bureau, but also underscore a greater issue in the PDPA overall –
the PDPA’s ambiguities have left data subjects, specifically the
drivers travelling on Taiwan’s highways, in privacy peril.
B. Taiwan’s National Health Insurance Research Databases
Since 1995, the Taiwanese government has mandated that
all citizens with official residency and all foreign nationals living
in Taiwan with an Alien Resident Certificate be covered under the
National Health Insurance (NHI) program to receive affordable
medical services.138 As of June 2019, a total of 23,894,289 people
were participating in NHI, equating to 99.9% of the population.139
The government agency in charge of the program is the
National Health Insurance Administration (NHIA), a department
within the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MHW). 140 To
successfully administer national health insurances affairs, the
NHIA must collect, process, and maintain both insured patients’

137
Lin Nan-Sen (林楠森), Taiwan LaiHong: DianZih ShouFei de GaoSuGongLu
(台灣來鴻：電子收費的高速公路) [A Letter from Taiwan: The Highway with a TollCollecting System], BBC (Jan. 30, 2014), https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/trad/taiwan_let
ters/2014/01/140130_tw_letters_motorwayfee.
138
See NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE ADMINISTRATION, 2020-2021 HANDBOOK
OF TAIWAN'S NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE 6 (Ministry of Health & Welfare 2019),
https://ws.nhi.gov.tw/001/Upload/293/RelFile/Ebook/English.pdf (last visited May 27,
2021).
139
NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE ADMINISTRATION, NATIONAL HEALTH
INSURANCE 2019-2020 ANNUAL REPORT 9 (Ministry of Health & Welfare 2020),
https://www.nhi.gov.tw/Nhi_ELibraryPubWeb/Periodical/P_Detail.aspx?CP_ID=221&CPT_TypeID=8.
140
NHIA Organization, NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE ADMINISTRATION (Jan. 27,
2016), https://www.nhi.gov.tw/english/Content_List.aspx?n=EF2C14B2B87D7E2E&top
n=ED4A30E51A609E49.
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and service providers’ information.141 The information collected
by the NHIA includes the personal data of patients, costs of the
medical treatment received, and appointment schedules.142
Since the NHI program is mandatory and almost all
Taiwanese citizens are covered, a vast amount of potentially
valuable personal data has been collected. In 1998, the NHIA
transferred the data from the insurance program to the National
Health Research Institute (NHRI), a non-profit foundation for
medical research funded primarily by the government. 143 The
NHRI proceeded to establish the National Health Insurance
Research Database (the Database) to maintain all “registration
files and original claims for reimbursement” that were transferred
from the NHI program.144 The Database also made these files and
claims available to academics who wished to use the data for
research.145
Nevertheless, the NHIA was questioned for failing to
properly de-identifying their medical data.146 The NHRI defended
itself and claimed that the personal identification numbers were
encrypted and patient birth dates were deleted (although the birth
year and month were retained) before the NHIA transferred the
data into the Database.147 The NHRI also de-identified the data
again before making it available for research purposes.148 Further,
the NHRI argued that to use the data from the Database for
141
See JianKang yu YiLiao ZihLiao de JiaJhih YingYong (Er): Cyuanmin Jiankang
Baosian Zihliaoku Jianjie (健康與醫療資料的加值應用(二): 全民健康保險資料庫簡介)
[Health and Medical Data Value-Added Application 2: Introduction to the National Health
Insurance Database], PANSCI (July 8, 2012), https://pansci.asia/archives/18437.
142
Id.
143
Overview,
NATIONAL
HEALTH
RESEARCH
INSTITUTE
(NHRI),
https://www.nhri.edu.tw/eng/About/more?id=757957da67f54478bb0030e32d0bc70d (last
visited Mar. 10, 2020).
144
Background, NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE RESEARCH DATABASE,
http://nhird.nhri.org.tw/en/index.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2020). See also Yu-Chun Chen
et al., Taiwan’s National Health Insurance Research Database: Administrative Health Care
Database as Study Object in Bibliometrics, 86 SCIENTOMETRICS 367, 365–80 (2011).
145
Id.
146
See, e.g., Tsai et al. v. National Health Insurance Administration, 102 NianDu
Su Zi No. 36 (102 年度訴字第 36 號判決) (Taipei GaoDeng XingZheng FaYuan (臺北高
等行政法院) [Taipei Administrative High Court], 2014) (Taiwan); Tsai et al. v. National
Health Insurance Administration, 106 NianDu Pan Zi No. 54 (106 年度判字第 54 號判決)
(ZuiGao XingZheng FaYuan (最高行政法院) [Supreme Administrative Court], 2017)
(Taiwan).
147
Tsai (Taipei Admin. High Ct. 2014) at 8–11.
148
Id.
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research purposes, an individual must fill out an application form
and submit their plan to an institutional review board (IRB) for
approval.149 The NHRI then consults experts to decide whether to
grant permission to applicants.150
In 2011, in addition to the Database, the MHW established
what became the Health and Welfare Data Science Center (Data
Center) to consolidate all valuable health information from the
NHI Program and make it available to both academic researchers
and government agencies.151 The goal of this data consolidation
was to facilitate governmental policy-making, promote medical
research, and encourage innovation. 152 Since 2016, the Data
Center has taken over the Database and became the sole resource
for NHI Program information. 153 Currently, the Data Center
Database is operated and maintained by the MHW. 154 To deidentify the data, the MHW staff will encrypt the data in their own
site before turning it over to the Data Center.155 The Data Center
also requires that researchers who want to access the data for
research purposes personally visit the Data Center and conduct all
data analysis while physically in the center.156 The Data Center
uses this process to reduce the risks of a data leak or any abuse of
the data. 157 The process of accessing data in the Data Center
Database is the same as the process of applying for data within the
Id.
Application Process, NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE RESEARCH DATABASE,
https://nhird.nhri.org.tw/apply_01.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2020).
151
About HWDC, HEALTH AND WELFARE DATA SCIENCE CENTER,
https://hdsr.ym.edu.tw/files/11-1274-1530.php?Lang=zh-tw (last visited Nov. 23, 2020).
152
Id.
153
See Ho, supra note 94, at 143; see also Latest News, NATIONAL HEALTH
INSURANCE RESEARCH DATABASE, http://nhird.nhri.org.tw/news (last visited Mar. 11,
2020). The announcement on the webpage states that the database service has been
terminated as of June 2015. All original data in the database was returned to the NHIA.
154
See National Health Insurance Research Database,
http://nhird.nhri.org.tw/news (last visited Nov. 23, 2020).
155
See Review Instructions for the Application of the Health and Welfare Data,
MINISTRY OF HEALTH AND WELFARE, https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ePVpZ_XsCcN3
wucWqKaJHcobb3AYMMxW/view (last visited June 15, 2020).
156
See HWDC Q & A, HEALTH AND WELFARE DATA SCIENCE CENTER (2017),
https://dep.mohw.gov.tw/DOS/np-2497-113.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2020).
157
See generally Lee Lili (李麗莉), JianBao ZihLiaoKu zai DaShuJyu ShihDai
MianLin GeZih BaoHu WunTi jhih TanTaor (健保資料庫在大數據時代面臨個資保護問
題之探討) [Exploring Personal Information Protection Issues in the Health Insurance
Database in the Age of Big Data], LEGISLATIVE YUAN, REPUBLIC OF CHINA (TAIWAN) (Dec.
18, 2018), https://www.ly.gov.tw/Pages/Detail.aspx?nodeid=6590&pid=179126.
149
150
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Database: a researcher must submit forms and plans, and these
must be approved by an IRB and reviewed by experts.158
The NHIA does not request consent from its data subjects
either before, during, or after the processing this vast array of
personal health information.159 This is significant because, in this
situation, the data subjects are the individuals insured under the
program – 99.9% of the Taiwanese population. 160 These data
subjects also have no opportunity to request for data controllers or
processors to stop using or processing their information.161 This
means that 99.9% of the population in Taiwan has no right to any
form of opt-out mechanism regarding their potentially personal
medical data.
In 2012, eight individuals from several civil rights
organizations, including the Taiwan Association of Human Rights,
filed a lawsuit against the NHIA and claimed that the NHIA’s
transfer of the data within the Data Center Database out to third
parties did not align with public interests.162 They also argued that
the data was not properly de-identified.163
According to the PDPA, medical records are categorized
as sensitive information and thus should not be collected,
processed, or used by the government or non-government
entities.164 However, sensitive information may be used by these
parties when it is necessary to do statistical or academic research
for the purpose of public interests, such as for “healthcare, public

158
See The Review Instructions for the Application of the Health and Welfare Data,
supra note 155.
159
See Tsai et al. v. National Health Insurance Administration, 102 NianDu Su Zi
No. 36 (102 年度訴字第 36 號判決) at 3, 6 (Taipei GaoDeng XingZheng FaYuan (臺北
高等行政法院) [Taipei Administrative High Court], 2014) (Taiwan).
160
See QuanMinJianKangBaoSian BaoSian DueiSiang RenShu An LeiBieh
SingBieh NianLingTseng TongJi (全民健康保險保險對象人數按類別性別年齡層統計)
[Gender and Age Statistics of the National Health Insurance], MINISTRY OF HEALTH AND
WELFARE, https://data.nhi.gov.tw/Datasets/DatasetDetail.aspx?id=288&Mid=LILIANYA
NG (last visited Nov. 23, 2020).
161
See Tsai (Taipei Admin. High Ct. 2014) at 3, 6.
162
Id.
163
See Chang Chen-Hung, Controversy over Information Privacy Arising from
Taiwan’s National Health Insurance Database, 40 CHUNG YUAN CHRISTIAN UNIV. L.
REV. 185, 187 (2018).
164
GenRen ZiLiao BaoHuFa (個人資料保護法) [Personal Data Protection Act]
ch. I, art. 6.
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health, or crime prevention.”165 However, a government agency
that intends to use this information for the public interest and in a
way beyond the scope of the original collection purpose shall also
have the data de-identified.166
In Tsai et al. v. NHIA, the plaintiffs first argued that,
because the NHIA did not obtain consent from the data subjects,
their process and use of the data should be limited to the scope of
the agency’s statutory duties under Article 6 of the PDPA. 167
Furthermore, they argued that because there was no public interest
involved in the agency’s publication of the data to the public, the
disclosure of the data to third parties violated the data subjects’
privacy.168 In response, the NHIA argued that there was a relevant
public interest because the data had been helpful to research and
resulted in academic periodical publications. 169 The plaintiffs
subsequently responded to this counterargument by claiming that
the NHIA could not prove a direct link between the public interest
and the research or academic publications.170
The plaintiffs also argued that the NHIA gave the third
parties improperly encrypted data.171 Without proper encryption,
individuals could be re-identified by combining the data stored in
the Databases with data stored elsewhere.172 The plaintiffs argued
that this was a direct violation of the PDPA.173 In response, the
NHIA maintained that the data had been through multiple layers
of encryption, which should be effective enough to ensure the
data’s security and prevent the re-identification of data subjects.174
165
Id. ch. I, art. 6. Additionally, Article 15 of the PDPA mandates that a government
agency that is going to collect or process personal data must provide a specific purpose for
the collection or processing and comply with one of the following conditions: “1. where it
is within the necessary scope to perform its statutory duties; 2. where consent has been
given by the data subject; or 3. where the rights and interests of the data subject will not be
infringed upon.”
166
Id. ch. II, art. 16.
167
See Tsai (Taipei Admin. High Ct. 2014) at 3, 6.
168
Id.
169
Id.
170
Id.
171
Id. at 5, 37.
172
Id.
173
GenRen ZiLiao BaoHuFa (個人資料保護法) [Personal Data Protection Act]
ch. I, art. 16.
174
See id. ch. I, art. 16; see also Tsai et al. v. National Health Insurance
Administration, 106 NianDu Pan Zi No. 54 (106 年度判字第 54 號判決) at 6 (ZuiGao
XingZheng FaYuan (最高行政法院) [Supreme Administrative Court], 2017) (Taiwan).
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The plaintiffs also raised the issue of the right to opt-out
from subsequent data uses, citing precedent from the
Constitutional Court of Taiwan.175 In the precedent, Interpretation
603, the Court elaborated that people should be equipped with the
right to control their own personal data because they must be able
to decide whether or not to disclose it, and, if so, “to what extent,
at what time, in what manner and to whom” such information will
be disclosed.176 Further, individuals also have the right “to correct
any inaccurate entries contained in their information.” 177 In a
separate opinion, the Court also stated that the freedom from
unwanted intrusion into one’s private life and individual’s
autonomy over one’s own personal data are recognized as
constitutional rights.178 However, the Court pointed out that the
right to control personal data is not absolute and could be
burdened with certain restrictions by the State.179
Citing the Constitutional Court of Taiwan, the Tsai et al.
plaintiffs argued that the “right to control personal data” includes
not only the right to consent to how one’s personal data will be
processed and used, but also the right to an opt-out mechanism –
the right to request their personal data not be used or processed.180
The PDPA even explicitly stipulates that individuals cannot waive
their right to “demand the cessation of the collection, processing
or use of his/her personal data.”181 This implies that there is a right
to opt-out. The plaintiffs contended that if they were not given the
opportunity to consent, then they are at least entitled to the right
to request that the use of their data cease.182
The plaintiffs lost their case in the Taipei High
Administrative Court (High Court), and subsequently appealed to

See Tsai (Taipei Admin. High Ct. 2014).
Interpretation No. 603, 2005 47 JUDICIAL YUAN GAZETTE 1, 1 (Sifayuan
Dafaguan Huiyi Sept. 28 2005).
177
Id.
178
See Interpretation No. 689, 2011 53 JUDICIAL YUAN GAZETTE 11, 11 (Sifayuan
Dafaguan Huiyi July 29, 2011), translation available at http://cons.judicial.gov.tw/jcc/enus/jep03/show?expno=689 (last visited May 27, 2021).
179
Id.
180
See generally Tsai (Taipei Admin. High Ct. 2014).
181
GenRen ZiLiao BaoHuFa (個人資料保護法) [Personal Data Protection Act]
ch. I, art. 3.
182
Tsai (Taipei Admin. High Ct. 2014) at 4.
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the Supreme Administrative Court (Supreme Court).183 In 2016,
the Supreme Court also ruled against the plaintiffs, finding in
favor of the NHIA.184
In response to the plaintiffs’ first argument that the NHIA
was unable to prove that there was a direct public interest related
to the use and disclosure of their personal data, both the High
Court and the Supreme Court found that both Databases were
established to add value to the plaintiffs’ raw data by assisting with
public health matters and academic research. 185 They also held
that the results from the Databases could further enhance the
overall welfare for all citizens, thus finding a public interest
justification in the use and disclosure of the personal data by the
NHIA.186
In making their determinations, both courts employed
balancing tests. The High Court emphasized that the PDPA’s
purpose is to “protect” rather than maintain “the secrecy” of
personal data.187 In other words, there are many ways to “protect”
the data, and this may include maintaining its secrecy, but they are
not one in the same. Therefore, when an individual’s privacy right
conflicts with the public interest, an individual’s right to control
their own data should “stand back” for the public interest.188 The
High Court also found that the databases contributed to medical
studies that were beneficial to all citizens, and this was more
important than the protection of individual privacy.189 In addition,
the High Court determined that the NHIA had properly deidentified the data and thus had used the data the manner least
183
See generally Tsai et al. v. National Health Insurance Administration, 106
NianDu Pan Zi No. 54 (106 年度判字第 54 號判決) (ZuiGao XingZheng FaYuan (最高
行政法院) [Supreme Administrative Court], 2017) (Taiwan).
184
Id.
185
Id. Tsai (Taipei Admin. High Ct. 2014).
186
See Tsai (Taipei Admin. High Ct. 2014) at 14 (“The goal of establishing HWDC
is adding value to individual health raw data and thus generating collective data that is
worth putting into application. This data can also enhance the quality of decisions on public
health, on academic research, and on innovations in health as well as medical industry, and
bring about benefits to all the Taiwanese people… It is obvious that the data is used for
academic purposes and is characterized by public interest.”); see also Tsai (Sup. Admin.
Ct. 2017), at 38 (“The macro data on all the citizens’ body, health, and medical treatment
plays a significant role in the progress of national health and welfare, which also holds
great public interests.”) (Translated).
187
Tsai (Taipei Admin. High Ct. 2014), at 17.
188
Id.
189
Id.
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harmful to an individual’s privacy.190 The High Court ultimately
held that the NHIA’s disclosure of the data was indeed necessary
and proper.191
The Supreme Court also balanced the public’s interests
against an individual’s privacy right. 192 The Supreme Court
recognized that data is a valuable social resource, and a
comprehensive database is an important and useful public good.193
The Supreme Court pointed out that the government’s data
collection resembles “sampling” in conducting a study. The
Supreme Court elaborated, emphasizing that “in the process of
sampling, one needs to be sure the samples could precisely be
representative of the original population…if we allow there are
[sic] any options for the samples, the quality of the samples would
be severely impacted.”194 Thus, the Supreme Court found that it
would be unreasonable to allow the plaintiffs to opt out of the
databases simply to protect the individuals’ right to privacy.195 In
its decision, the Supreme Court expressed concern that other
individuals may follow the plaintiffs’ lead if individuals are
granted the right to opt-out, and this result could squander the
efforts and the expenses that the NHIA had spent on gathering the
data and building the databases.196
The Tsai et al. v. NHIA case has revealed several alarming
perils of open data in Taiwan. First, it is apparent that a detailed
and thoughtful privacy protection program is absent from
Taiwan’s implementation of its open data initiatives. In Tsai et al.,
Id.
Id.
192
Id.
193
Id. at 36 (“Information is a social resource of great worth. The cost of collecting
information is also expensive (The more the information, the more expensive for collecting
the information.). (“How if being used properly, the information could generate more
benefits. Therefore, a comprehensive database would be an important public good.”)
(Translated).
194
Id. at 37.
195
Id. (“As for thoroughly excluding specific subjects’ data for the reason of
respecting individuals’ information privacy, it would exceed reasonableness and even
become an obstacle to the realization of public interests . . . If allowing the selection of the
samples that are gathered, the quality of sampling result would be gravely impacted.”)
(Translated).
196
Id. at 42. (“[I]f a few people were allowed to opt out of the [sampling], then a
majority of individuals could also ask for the same treatment on the basis of the requirement
of enforcement equality, which would further bring about the “broken window effect,” and
result in the unnecessary waste of the cost of data gathering.”) (Translated).
190
191
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the NHIA lacked a sophisticated de-identification and monitoring
process while simultaneously being responsible for collecting and
handling almost every Taiwanese resident’s health information.
By relying solely on a questionable de-identification process, the
NHIA ignored all other viable options for protecting their data
subjects’ privacy.
The next question raised by Tsai et al. concerns the extent
of de-identification and how much must be done to achieve the
protection of personal data.197 Although the PDPA requires that
data subjects must not be able to be identified after information is
processed or disclosed, the law itself remains ambiguous about
what exactly “de-identification” means and to what extent deidentification is necessary. 198 The PDPA leaves it open, relying
instead upon the discretion of government agencies and decisions
made by courts.199 As a result, the strength of privacy protections
for Taiwanese citizens is uncertain and hinges on the internal
procedures of government agencies and judges’ understanding and
recognition of privacy.
In Tsai et al. v. NHIA, the Supreme Court chose to blame
data predators for possible privacy violations. 200 However, the
peril that results from the combination of dispersed databases is
exactly where privacy advocates should focus their concern. 201 In
contrast to this opinion from the Supreme Court, the international
community and international organizations, such as the
197
Many prominent legal scholars have long recognized that anonymization and
de-identification would not be an ultimate guarantee of privacy protection. See, e.g.,
Kathleen Benitez & Bradley Malin, Evaluating Re-identification Risks with Respect to the
HIPAA Privacy Rule, 37 J. LAW, MEDICINE & ETHICS 169, 170 (2010); Paul Ohm, Broken
Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L.
REV. 1701, 1719-20 (2010); Jules Polonetsky, Omer Tene & Kelsey Finch, Shades of Gray:
Seeing the Full Spectrum of Practical Data De-Identification, 56 SAN CLARA L.
REV. 593, 602 (2016); Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII +9Problem: Privacy
and a New Concept of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 1841
(2011).
198
See GenRen ZiLiao BaoHuFa (個人資料保護法) [Personal Data Protection
Act] ch. I, arts. 6, 9; ch. II, art. 16; ch. III, arts. 19, 20.
199
Id.
200
Tsai et al. v. National Health Insurance Administration, 106 NianDu Pan Zi No.
54 (106 年度判字第 54 號判決) at 36 (ZuiGao XingZheng FaYuan (最高行政法院)
[Supreme Administrative Court], 2017) (Taiwan).
201
See Briefing Paper on Data and Privacy, CARNEGIE UNITED KINGDOM TRUST,
(June 2017), https://www.involve.org.uk/sites/default/files/uploads/Better-Use-of-Databackground-briefing.pdf.
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Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, have
recognized that governments must be responsible for enhancing
database safeguards and protections.202 Governments worldwide
have opted for intensified privacy protection to provide a safer and
more trustworthy data environment that can further encourage the
development of data usage. 203 Nonetheless, in Tsai et al., the
Supreme Court strayed from this international regulatory trend
and therefore missed the opportunity to urge Taiwan’s government
toward a stronger privacy protection regime, particularly for the
protection of sensitive medical data.
The Taiwanese government has wrongly equated “public
purpose” with “public interest.” Even worse, the decisions
analyzed above further depicts that courts, without any adequate
deliberation on the constitutional meaning of data privacy, rushed
to endorse the government’s mistaken view of the definition of
“public interest” in the PDPA. However, in reality, the PDPA does
not address the standards that should be used to determine “public
interest.” Neither the High Court nor the Supreme Court provided
sophisticated reasoning in answering these questions about
whether and how reasonable and feasible criteria should be
established in PDPA. 204 Rather, the courts mistakenly equated
public purpose with “public interest” – if the defendant claimed
the measures were adopted for a public purpose, whether for
medical research or innovation, the courts assumed that there was
a potential public interest.205 This same “public interest” rationale
also led the Supreme Court to deny the opt-out right and require
that the plaintiffs’ health data remain indefinitely in the Database
regardless of the plaintiffs’ opposing desires.
202
See Health Data Governance: Privacy, Monitoring and Research (Policy Brief
version), OECD (Oct. 5, 2015), https://www.oecd.org/publications/health-datagovernance-9789264244566-en.htm.
203
Id.
204
See Tsai et al. v. National Health Insurance Administration, 102 NianDu Su Zi
No. 36 (102 年度訴字第 36 號判決) at 18 (Taipei GaoDeng XingZheng FaYuan (臺北高
等行政法院) [Taipei Administrative High Court], 2014) (Taiwan) (The High Court pointed
out that the NHIA’s giving data to third parties was “…for academic research. The transfer
of the data was for academic purposes, which was obviously in the public interest.”); Tsai
(Sup. Admin. Ct. 2017) at 36. (The Supreme Court did not specify what “public interest”
is. Instead, the Supreme Court proceeded to state that “the establishment of a large database
was very important for quantitative research.”).
205
See Tsai (Sup. Admin. Ct. 2017), at 36, 37; Tsai (Taipei Admin. High Ct. 2014),
at 16.
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C. Data Sharing and Surveillance Practices in Response to
COVID-19
During the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic, the
fear of the virus prompted sentiment of unity within the Taiwanese
community. 206 Spurred by people’s need for public safety, the
Taiwanese government adopted stringent surveillance
measures. 207 The data sharing and surveillance practices
implemented to combat COVID-19 have demonstrated how the
democratic government’s actions, while supported by citizens’
wishes for effective control over the pandemic, might impact civil
rights and liberties. Taiwan’s story may even imply the possibility
that citizens are willing to sacrifice privacy in exchange for public
safety in emergency situations. However, it triggers another
critical concern: would this anomalous violation of privacy
intended to be temporary become “normalized” as a long-standing
practice?208
In early 2020, COVID-19 plunged the world into a global
pandemic. 209 Governments around the world declared states of
emergency210 and adopted technological measures to deal with the
outbreak. 211 These measures included data surveillance on
206
See Huang Tzu-Ti, Rumors of Pneumonia Cases Reignite SARS Fears in China,
TAIWAN NEWS (Dec. 31, 2019), https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3847781; see
also, Keoni Everington, Taiwan's CDC Issues Warning for Plague in China, TAIWAN NEWS
(Nov. 18, 2019), https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3819546.
207
See Pandemic Prevention | What Does Taiwan Prepare for COVID-19, TAIWAN
EXTERNAL TRADE DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL, https://www.anticovid19tw.org/295-2/ (last
visited May 28, 2021).
208
See, e.g., Darius Tahir, Surveillance Helped These Countries Fight Covid. A
New Realm of Risks Await, POLITICO (Apr. 21, 2021), https://www.politico.com/newslette
rs/future-pulse/2021/04/21/surveillance-helped-these-countries-fight-covid-a-new-realmof-risks-await-794790.
209
Archived: WHO Timeline — COVID-19, WHO (Apr. 27, 2020),
https://www.who.int/news/item/27-04-2020-who-timeline---covid-19 (last visited Nov. 23,
2020).
210
See, e.g., Justin McCurry, Japan Declares State of Emergency over Coronavirus,
GUARDIAN (Apr. 7, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/07/japan-shinzoabe-declares-state-of-emergency-over-coronavirus; Rosie Perper et al., Almost All US
States Have Declared States of Emergency to Fight Coronavirus — Here's What It Means
for Them, BUSINESS INSIDER (Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.businessinsider.com/california
-washington-state-of-emergency-coronavirus-what-it-means-2020-3.
211
See, e.g., Creating the Coronopticon: Countries Are Using Apps and Data
Networks to Keep Tabs on the Pandemic, ECONOMIST (Mar. 26, 2020), https://www.econ
omist. com/briefing/2020/03/26/countries-are-using- apps-and-data-networks-to-keep-

578

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 30 NO. 3

individuals’ travel history via data sharing within multiple
databases maintained by government agencies,212 via requesting
communications data from private sector actors such as internet
and telecommunications companies, 213 and via contact tracing,
personal location, and health condition tracking through mobile
software applications (apps). 214 Taiwan’s government was no
different, as it also employed data sharing and surveillance
measures in response to COVID-19.215 Each response implicates
Taiwanese fundamental rights to privacy and other constitutional
liberties. In this section, we first discuss the approaches to data
sharing and surveillance that the Taiwanese government employed
in its response to COVID-19. Next, we present a constitutional
and legal analysis of the regulatory measures adopted by Taiwan
and how these measures might compromise the protection of
citizens’ fundamental rights in the name of saving lives from
COVID-19.
In response to the outbreak of COVID-19 in Wuhan,
China, at the end of 2019, the Taiwan NHIA linked their medical
Database with the “immigration database” maintained by the
National Immigration Agency to track whether an individual had
traveled into Taiwan from Wuhan.216 This combined database was
tabs-on-the-pandemic; see also, Darius Tahir, Surveillance Helped These Countries Fight
Covid. A New Realm of Risks Await, POLITICO (Apr. 21, 2021), https://www.politico.com/
newsletters/future-pulse/2021/04/21/surveillance-helped-these-countries-fight-covid-anew-realm-of-risks-await-794790.
212
See, e.g., Coronavirus: Under Surveillance and Confined at Home in Taiwan,
BBC (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-52017993.
213
See, e.g., Huang Ya-Sheng, Sun Mei-Cen & Sui Yu-Ze, How Digital Contact
Tracing Slowed Covid-19 in East Asia, HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 15, 2020),
https://hbr.org/2020/04/how-digital-contact-tracing-slowed-covid-19-in-east-asia; see also
Jon Fingas, Israel Stops Using Phone Tracking to Enforce COVID-19 Quarantines:
Overseers Believe the Harm to Privacy Outweighs the Benefits, ENGADGET (April 22,
2020), https://www.engadget.com/israel-halts-phone-tracking-for-covid-19-quarantine184622314.html.
214
See Factbox: The Race to Deploy COVID-19 Contact Tracing Apps, REUTERS
(May 14, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-apps-factboxidUSKBN22Q2KU.
215
See Shu-Wan Jian et al., Contact Tracing with Digital Assistance in Taiwan’s
COVID-19 Outbreak Response, 1 INT’L J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES, 348, 349–50 (Oct. 2020).
216
See Wu Bo-Xuan (吳柏軒), JjianBaoShu 1 Tian GengSin YunDuanSTtong 1640
WuHan RuJingJhe WuSuoDun (健保署 1 天更新雲端系統 1640 武漢入境者無所遁)
[National Health Insurance Administration Updates Cloud System in 1 Day, 1640 Wuhan
Immigrants Have Nowhere to Go], LIBERTY TIMES (Jan. 27, 2020), https://news.ltn.com.t
w/news/life/breakingnews/3050362.
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eventually linked to include the travel history of citizens coming
into Taiwan from Japan, Korea, and other nearby countries if the
nation reported growing COVID-19 outbreaks. 217 The primary
purpose of linking these databases was to allow physicians to
automatically check for a patient’s travel history and determine if
there was any risk of COVID-19 exposure.218 However, this vast
access to information led to some extreme and absurd results when
individuals with recent travel histories sought medical services.
For instance, a woman with a tooth ache was rejected by 10
dentists because of a recent visit to Hokkaido, Japan.219
Although from the outbreak in late 2019 to April 2021,
Taiwan has fortunately managed to keep the COVID-19 outbreak
largely under control within the country, 220 the following case
ironically illustrates the inadequacies of the travel history
surveillance system. The first wave of confirmed cases in Taiwan
came after a Taiwanese navy ship with dozens of sailors returned
from a visit to Palau in early April.221 Legislator Chen Jiau-hua
(陳椒華) revealed that some of the sailors with confirmed cases
of COVID-19 visited health clinics after disembarking in

See Chang Ming-Xuan (張茗喧), 147 Wan ZengDao Rih Han MinJhong JiCi
Cha JianBaoKa MiaoCha LyuYouShih (147 萬曾到日韓民眾 即起插健保卡秒查旅遊史)
[1.47 Million Individuals Who Had Traveled to Japan and/or South Korea Who Have
Visited Japan and South Korea, Can Be Checked With Their Health Insurance Card],
CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY (Feb. 21, 2020), https://www.cna.com.tw/news/firstnews/2020
02215012.aspx.
218
See, e.g., Helier Cheung, Coronavirus: What Could the West Learn from Asia?,
BBC (Mar. 21, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-51970379.
219
See generally Keoni Everington, Taiwanese Woman Rejected by 10 Dentists
After Returning from Hokkaido, TAIWAN NEWS (Feb. 20, 2020), https://www.taiwannews
.com.tw/en/news/3878893.
220
Since the outbreak of COVID-19 until April 2021, the total number of cases in
Taiwan was 1,057, with 11 deaths and 1022 recovered (data on April 12, 2021). However,
ever since May 2021, Taiwan was caught short by the outbreak of the UK variant, the
COVID-19 cases increased in a sudden. According to the Taiwan Centers for Disease
Control, the total number of cases in Taiwan is 7,806, with 99 deaths and 1,133 recovered
(this is current as of May 29, 2021). See COVID-19 Cases Report, TAIWAN CENTERS FOR
DISEASE CONTROL, https://sites.google.com/cdc.gov.tw/2019-ncov/taiwan (last visited
May 29, 2021).
221
See Ben Blanchard, Taiwan to Quarantine 700 Navy Sailors After Virus
Outbreak, REUTERS (Apr. 18, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-healthcoronavirus-taiwan-idUSKBN2200BQ.
217

580

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 30 NO. 3

Taiwan,222 but the clinics were not alerted to their travel history
when they checked their health insurance records.223 Furthermore,
since May 2021, Taiwan was caught short by the outbreak of the
B.1.1.7 variant, and the COVID-19 cases increased in a
sudden.224Professor Chunhuei Chi, the director of Oregon State
University’s center for global health, described Taiwan as “a
victim of its own success”.225 He further explained that although
Taiwan had locally eliminated the virus in early 2020, it neither
prioritized the procurement of vaccines nor stayed up to date with
the new COVID-19 variant’s increased transmissibility and high
asymptomatic rate .226To deal with the sudden rapid growth of the
COVID-19 cases, the Central Epidemic Command Center (CECC)
has adopted data sharing and surveillance approaches like
collaborating with the telecommunication service providers to
single out certain citizens as “high-risk group” in the health
insurance card. 227 Yet, this policy confused local hospitals and
raised questions like “should we refuse the patients from the highrisk group?” or “where can those patients in the high-risk group to
be transferred?” were emerged.228 In other words, the data sharing
and data surveillance practices adopted by the Taiwanese
government without clear legal authority may not be as effective
as claimed. The positive aspects of mitigating and containing the
COVID-19 pandemic by linking a patient’s travel history to their
222
See Guo Jian-Shen (郭建伸), LiWei Jhih DunMuJian GuanBing JianBaoKa Wu
ChuGuoShih TiSing JyunFang JhuYi (立委指敦睦艦官兵健保卡無出國史 提醒軍方注
意) [Legislator Pointed Out That Goodwill Fleet Officers and Soldiers Have No History of
Going Abroad, Reminding the Military to Pay Attention], CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY, (Apr.
20, 2020), https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aipl/202004200222.
223
Id.
224
See Helen Davidson, Taiwan Raises Covid Alert Level Nationwide as Infections
Increase, THE GUARDIAN (May 19, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/ma
y/19/taiwan-raises-covid-alert-level-amid-rise-in-infections.
225
Id.
226
Id.
227
See Xie Xing-En (謝 幸 恩) & Hong Ling-ling (洪 玲 玲), NeiBu WenJian
PuGuang! ZhiHui ZhongXin Jing MiLing JianCe WanHua 60 WanRen ZuJi TiaoChu
GaoFengXian XuQun ZhuJi JianBaoKa (內部文件曝光！指揮中心竟密令監測萬華 60
萬人足跡 挑出「高風險族群」註記健保卡) [Internal Document Exposed! CECC
Secretly Commanded Monitor the Footprints of 600,000 People in WanHua Single Out the
"High-Risk Groups" and Mark Up in the Health Insurance Card], YI MEDIA (毅傳媒)
(May 26, 2021), https://yimedia.com.tw/covid19/117647/?fbclid=IwAR0Luo2D0kcZzA4
Dg-g-6o7WRF5AVGHucSCjMLwfjfabp5YUWa4BzhRueDs.
228
Id.
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health insurance card, are greatly diminished if some patients’
need for medical services are rejected without justification and
individuals’ privacy rights are traded in exchange for inconsistent
travel history alerts. Here, we present several approaches to data
sharing and surveillance that the Taiwanese government employed
in its response to COVID-19: the “M-Police,” the “Intellectual
Surveillance Electronic Fence System,” and the “Taiwan Social
Distancing App.”
1. The “M-Police.” — In 2007, the National Police
Agency (NPA) of the Ministry of Interior began to build a police
cloud computing device called the “Police Mobile ” (known as the
“M-Police” infrastructure) to promote and increase law
enforcement effectiveness. 229 From 2012 to 2016, the basic
platform of the Police Cloud Computing and the Police Mobile
Computer System was established.230 Information in 31 databases
from six government agencies concerning people, vehicles,
criminal cases, objects, time, places, photos, and videos was
integrated into the platform to enhance the efficiency of criminal
investigations. 231 The “M-Police” also use commercial
smartphones to easily customize to police equipment that decrease
the heavy weight.232 Essentially, the “M-Police” is the deployment
of big data policing platforms that aggregates and analyzes
massive amounts of personal information. However, although
helpful, this expansive amount of combined data can lead to
discrimination and privacy invasions, which occurred in Taiwan
during the COVID-19 pandemic.
In late February 2020, a young Indonesian woman who
worked in several northern Taiwanese hospitals was Taiwan's
See generally Police Cloud – M-Police Mobile Computer System, SCSE,
https://en.smartcity.org.tw/index.php/en-us/component/k2/item/47-police-cloud-mpolice-mobile-computer-system (last visited Apr. 18, 2020).
230
Id.
231
Id. According to one of the contractors who helped the NPA establish the
infrastructure, the Cloud Computing System provides 17 police applications, which include
M-Police Integrated Query System, Real Time Audio and Video Transmission System,
Instant Photo Comparison System, Instant License Plate Recognition System, Citizen
Interview System, Police Instant Message System, Police Regulations Query, Police
Common Operational Procedures Inquiry, etc. In addition to these powerful tracking
applications, the Cloud Computing System also integrates the Cloud Police Mission
Dispatch System, the Suspicious Vehicle Track Inquiry System, and the Police Service App.
The system has significantly improved the efficiency of police in tracking individuals.
232
Id.
229
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32nd confirmed COVID-19 case. 233 The woman was an
undocumented migrant.234 She was hired to work as a caregiver
for an elderly man who was hospitalized and diagnosed as
Taiwan's 27th COVID-19 case from February 11 to February
16.235 The NPA helped the Center for Disease Control (CDC) track
down this undocumented caregiver through the M-Police, and the
CDC subsequently placed the woman in a negative-pressure
isolated ward for quarantine and testing.236 When explaining the
details of this confirmed case to the press, government authorities
publicized the woman’s past locations and movements. 237 The
authorities also revealed many closed-circuit images retrieved
from the Police Cloud Computing System to show that she had
visited numerous sites in greater Taipei by traveling on buses, the
Taipei Rapid Transit Corporation Metro Service, the Taipei Mass
Rapid Transit, and Taiwan Railways Administration trains. 238
Every detail that the M-Police had accumulated and retrieved
about this woman was then widely reported in the newspaper, on
TV news stations, and throughout the internet.239 It is apparent that
even without any emergency use or exception clauses that may
have relaxed data privacy regulations, many private details about
the life of this young Indonesian woman were unnecessarily
collected and revealed without adequate considerations or her
consent.
2. The “intellectual surveillance electronic fence
233
Taiwan Centers for Disease Control Press Release, Taiwan Confirms Foreign
Caregiver of Case #27 as 32nd Case of COVID-19, CDC (Feb. 26, 2020),
https://www.cdc.gov.tw/En/Bulletin/Detail/QMZlqDJORsFvH6k9GJHB2Q?typeid=158.
234
See Nick Aspinwall, Calls for Amnesty as Undocumented Worker in Taiwan
Contracts the Coronavirus, DIPLOMAT (Feb. 29, 2020), https://thediplomat.com/2020/02/
calls-for-amnesty-as-undocumented-worker-in-taiwan-contracts-the-coronavirus/.
235
See Taiwan Centers for Disease Control Press Release, supra note 233.
236
See Roy Ngerng, Taiwan's Digital Response to Covid-19: Impressive, But Is
Privacy Respected?, NEWS LENS (Mar. 27, 2020), https://international.thenewslens.com/a
rticle/133095.
237
Id.
238
See Keoni Everington, Indonesian Infected with Coronavirus Traveled
Extensively on Taipei MRT, TRA, TAIWAN NEWS (Feb. 27, 2020), https://www.taiwannew
s.com.tw/en/news/3882260.
239
See Chen Wei-ting & Matthew Mazzetta, Migrant Caregiver Confirmed as
Taiwan's 32nd COVID19 Case, FOCUS TAIWAN (Feb. 26, 2020), https://focustaiwan.tw/society/202002260013;
see also Friend of 32nd Coronavirus Case Quarantined in Kaohsiung After Showing
Symptoms, TAIWAN NEWS (Feb. 28, 2020), https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/388
2660.
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system.” — As part of the governmental effort to contain the
spread of COVID-19, 240 the National Communication
Commission (NCC), the most important regulator of
telecommunication companies in Taiwan, demanded that five
major telecommunication service providers in Taiwan deploy an
“Intellectual Surveillance Electronic Fence System” (Surveillance
System) to individuals’ cell phones241 to trace their movements in
quarantine.242 The NCC supervises the Surveillance System and
monitors whether individuals stay in their quarantine location243
by reviewing locations detected on their phones. 244 The
Surveillance System, deployed onto individuals’ cell phones, is
connected to the M-Police.245 Whenever any individual has left
240
See Chen Wei-Ting et al., CECC Issues Alert About Movements of 24 Infected
Military Personnel, FOCUS TAIWAN (Apr. 20, 2020), https://focustaiwan.tw/society/2020
04200008.
241
The phone could be self-owned phone or temporarily provided by the
government during the quarantine period. See NCC Chenqiing: Taiwan “Dianzih Fangyi
Fuwu Pingtai” Wei Guoren Zihjhu Kaifa Weiyu Waiguo Hezuo Cieci Yunyong Fuhe Falyu
Gueiding Cingwu Wuchuan, (NCC 澄清：臺灣「電子防疫服務平臺」為國人自主開發，
未與外國合作，且其運用符合法律規定，請勿誤傳) [NCC Clarification: Taiwan
“Electronic Epidemic Prevention Service Platform” Was Developed by Taiwanese Without
Cooperation with Other Nations, and the Operation Was Legal. Please Do Not Be
Misinformed], NAT’L COMMUNICATION COMM’N (国家通讯委员会) [GUÓJIĀ TŌNGXÙN
WĚIYUÁNHUÌ] (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.ncc.gov.tw/chinese/news_detail.aspx?site_co
ntent_sn=8&cate=0&keyword=&is_history=0&pages=0&sn_f=42899.
242
See, e.g., Mary Hui, How Taiwan Is Tracking 55,000 People Under Home
Quarantine in Real Time, QUARTZ (Mar. 31, 2020), https://qz.com/1825997/taiwan-phonetracking-system-monitors-55000-under-coronavirus-quarantine/.
243
There are several types of quarantine locations, including residential homes,
hotels, and university dorms, under the rules promulgated by Taiwan Centers for Disease
Control Taiwan. See, e.g., COVID-19 FAQs, TAIWAN CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL,
https://www.cdc.gov.tw/En/Category/QAPage/SbkmnM5v0OwdDMjJ2tI_xw (last visited
Nov. 20, 2020); Taiwan Universities to Stop Serving as Quarantine Locations in September,
TAIWAN NEWS (Aug. 22, 2020), https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3992809; see
also Taipei City Government’s COVID-19 Epidemic Prevention SOPs, TAIPEI CITY GOV’T,
https://english.gov.taipei/covid19/News.aspx?n=4BFB872E1F01E0E6&sms=DFD7BFA
E73CC0B5C (last visited Nov. 20, 2020).
244
See Taiwan Centers for Disease Control Press Release, Keji Fangyi Zaituei
“Yijhih Shentong” & “Shuangsian Gjiansyun” Jhueizong Geli Jianyi (科技防疫，再推
「疫止神通」、「雙向簡訊」追蹤隔離檢疫) [Technology in Pandemic Prevention, to
promote “the Pandemic Prevention Line Chatbot” & “Bilateral Short Message Service”
in Tracking the Quarantine], CDC (Apr. 8, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov.tw/Bulletin/Detail
/-7_x7Lq6ecIzxPyKAGcfyQ?typeid=9.
245
See Sun Cheng-Wu (孫承武), FangYi wu SiJiao JinJing DianZi WeiLi ZhiHui
JianKong (防疫無死角 金警電子圍籬智慧監控) [No Dead Angle in Epidemic Prevention
Police’s Intellectual Surveillance Electronic Fence], CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY (Mar. 28,
2020), https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aloc/202003280143.aspx.
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her or his quarantine site, the Surveillance System sends a short
message service (SMS) alert to the individuals, related
administrators, and the local police on duty.246 The police and the
civil affairs officers then arrive at the quarantine site to investigate
its condition and attempt to locate the individual who left.247 If it
the quarantine order is properly obeyed, no penalty or other
control measures will be imposed on the individual.248 However,
if the officers determines that quarantine is violated, a serious
penalty will follow. 249 This practice presents several complex
questions regarding the extent of the government’s reach into an
individuals’ private affairs. For example, is it appropriate for the
government to electronically “fence” a person in this fashion? Is
this practice, which essentially fences and freezes civil rights and
liberties, equivalent to an embrace of authoritarianism? This
normalization of an arguably draconian regulation in the name of
public health remains an unanswered question in the realm of
personal privacy protection. Will this “fencing” and tracking of
citizens be as destructive to democracy as many privacy violation
measures advocated for and adopted by governments in the years
following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United
States?250
3. The “Taiwan social distancing app.” — Taiwan social
distancing app was developed in mid-March 2020, under
instruction from Taiwan’s Vice Cabinet Premier Chen Chi-Mai.
This app uses Bluetooth technology to measure the distance
246
Id. Moreover, the post on March 24, 2020, on the Facebook page of the Ministry
of the Interior, R.O.C. addressed clearly by stating that: “ZhiYao NiBenRen LiKai DianZi
WeiLi, WoMen JiuHui MaShang FaJianXun GaiNi, DaDianHua GaiNi” (只要你本人離
開電子圍籬，我們就會馬上發簡訊給你、打電話給你！) [Once you left the quarantine
site, we will send a SMS to you and call you right away!], see https://www.facebook.com
/moi.gov.tw/photos/a.1046870208674715/3265323943495986/?type=3 (last visited May
29, 2021).
247
Id.
248
See Taiwan Centers for Disease Control Press Release, JhueiZong Geli
JianYiJhe WuBi ShouFa WeiJheJjia JhongCcaiFa (居家隔離, 檢疫者務必守法, 違者加
重裁罰) [People Whose Household Isolation or Quarantine Must Comply with the Laws,
Increased Penalty if Disobeyed], CDC (Apr. 1, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov.tw/Bulletin/D
etail/U-LF86uDS470CSFM943JwQ?typeid=9.
249
Id.
250
See Top Ten Abuses of Power Since 9/11, ACLU,
https://www.aclu.org/other/top-ten-abuses-power-911 (last visited May 30, 2021); see also
G. Alex Sinha, NSA Surveillance Since 9/11 and the Human Right to Privacy, 59 LOY. L.
REV. 861, 911–15 (2014).
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between individuals. 251 Chen Chi-Mai asserted that the app is
completely voluntary to use, and the data collected by the app
would be encrypted and not be used to investigate individuals’
locations.252 Still, critics from Taiwan’s civil society have raised
questions as to whether collecting and processing the data will
create privacy issues.253
During May 2021, when Taiwan experienced a huge
COVID-19 outbreak, the CECC announced that the Taiwan social
distancing app had been launched for public use.254 The health
authority has begun upload data to servers maintained by the CDC
after obtaining consent from confirmed cases. The app will then
automatically notify app users who have contacted with the
confirmed case in the past 14 days and ask them to monitor their
health status.255The government and this app’s developer claimed
that users’ privacy will be rigorously protected since users do not
need to register their personal information; moreover, the app uses
Bluetooth device signal to estimate the physical social
interactions, 256 and transforms data to anonymous hashed
identification stored on each individual’s device for up to 28

251
Taiwan Develops Mobile App for Social Distancing, TAIWAN XINWEN (台灣英
文
新
聞) [TAIWAN NEWS] (Apr. 12, 2020),
https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3914679; see also Pan Nai-Xin (潘 乃 欣),
SheJiao JyuLi App Pu YinSih? Taiwan AI ShiYanShi: Bi OuMeng GuiFan Geng Yan (社交
距離 APP 曝隱私？ 台灣 AI 實驗室：比歐盟規範更嚴) [Social Distancing App Expose
Privacy? Taiwan AI Labs: Stricter than the EU Standard], LIÁNHÉ MĚI RÌ XĪNWÉN (聯合
報
)
[UNITED
DAILY
NEWS]
(Apr.
25,
2020),
https://health.udn.com/health/story/120950/4517830.
252
Pan, supra note 251.
253
See, e.g., Taiwan RenQuan CuJinHui (台灣人權促進會) [Taiwan Association
for Human Rights], GongWei WeiJi zhong RuHe BaoZhang GongMinQuan (公衛危機中，
如何保障公民權) [Protecting Civil Liberties During a Public Health Crisis], MEDIUM
(Mar. 18, 2020), https://medium.com/@tahr1984/protecting-civil-liberties-during-apublic-health-crisis-1de3c6d8e724.
254
See Taiwan Centers for Disease Control Press Release, Taiwan Social
Distancing App Available for Download; Public Urged to Use App to Receive Information
About COVID-19 Spread, CDC (May 14, 2021),
https://www.cdc.gov.tw/En/Bulletin/Detail/32-hon2vaFXEQjxIGmqRgw?typeid=158.
255
Id. See also Taiwan SheJiao JuLi App Chang Jian WenDaJi (「臺灣社交距離
App」常見問答集) [FAQ for "Taiwan Social Distancing App"], CDC (May 25, 2021),
https://www.cdc.gov.tw/File/Get/Meq89j-Rb_TFblM5dEfmAA.
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See Taiwan Social Distancing, GOOGLE PLAY,
https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=tw.gov.cdc.exposurenotifications&hl=en&g
l=US (last visited May 30, 2021).
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days. 257 However, the app’s effectiveness is so far limited.
According to the CDC, although the app already had more than
800,000 downloads, only 29 new community infections of
COVID-19 were reported via this app.258
The M-Police system, the Electronic Fence, and the
Taiwan social distancing app, are the primary surveillance
measures that the Taiwan public authorities have employed to
fight the COVID-19 pandemic. However, these measures raise
questions about the extent to which society should accept tradeoffs between a public interest in health and safety and individual
privacy. In light of the legal implications of these pandemicresponse measures, we argue that public health interests can be
achieved without sacrificing digital privacy and accepting
widespread surveillance. The M-Police system, the Electronic
Fence, and the Taiwan social distancing app indeed provide some
pandemic prevention and control. 259 However, these measures
may also result in the erosion of individuals’ rights to privacy and
liberty. In Taiwan, three laws must be examined to properly
analyze the legal implications of these pandemic response
measures: the Communicable Disease Control Act (CDC Act), the
Special Act for Prevention, Relief and Revitalization Measures for
Severe Pneumonia with Novel Pathogens (COVID-19 Special
Act), and the PDPA.
According to several prominent Taiwanese legal scholars
who specialize in public health law, “these measures were not
carefully scrutinized according to the rule of law and
constitutional principles.”260 They correctly noted that:
The Personal Data Protection Act sets out rules
for collecting, processing, and using personal
Id.
See Kay Liu, Public Encouraged to Use Contact Tracing App as COVID-19
Cases Rise, FOCUS TAIWAN (May 14, 2021), https://focustaiwan.tw/scitech/202105140013; COVID-19 Cases Report, TAIWAN CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL,
https://sites.google.com/cdc.gov.tw/2019-ncov/taiwan (last visited May 30, 2021).
259
From the outbreak in 2019 to April 2021, the total number of cases in Taiwan
is 1,057, with 11 deaths and 1,022 recovered. See COVID-19 Cases Report, TAIWAN
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, https://sites.google.com/cdc.gov.tw/2019-ncov/taiwan
(last visited Apr. 12, 2021).
260
See Lin Ching-Fu et al., Reimagining the Administrative State in Times of
Global Health Crisis: An Anatomy of Taiwan’s Regulatory Actions in Response to the
COVID-19 Pandemic, 11 EUR. J. RISK REGUL. 256, 267 (2020).
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data, such as lawfulness, purpose limitation, data
minimization, and data security, but it has long
been plagued by inflexible legal transplant and
legal formalism without taking into account local
contexts and failed to provide a healthy
regulatory environment.261
These experts question whether, despite the CDC Act and
the COVID-19 Special Act authorizing the government to impose
“other necessary measures,” connecting multiple databases and
collecting and analyzing surveillance data should actually be
qualified as one of these “other necessary measures.” 262
Consequently, they believe the measures cannot survive legal
scrutiny.263 Similar views have been expressed by other scholars.
For example, some have expressed concerns that the enforcement
of regulatory measures regarding data sharing and contact tracing
has gone beyond the legal limit authorized by the PDPA and the
CDC Act.264 These scholars therefore recommend that the scope
of “public interest” as used in the PDPA be further clarified,
particularly in the context of fighting the battle against COVID19.265 Scholars have also argued that neither the CDC Act nor the
PDPA have defined how the surveillance data may be used,
transferred, and shared.266
While most of the technological measures and data
sharing platforms implemented in response to the pandemic offer
public health benefits, they also pose grave threats to personal
autonomy and significant risks to information privacy. China's
COVID-19 health code application system is an example of

Id.
Id.
263
Id.
264
See Lee Chung-Hsi (李崇僖), Zai WunYi ManYan jhong JianShih GeZih BaoHu
FaJhih (在瘟疫蔓延中檢視個資保護法制) [Examines the Legal System of Personal Data
Protection in the Spread of The Plague], 387 TAIWAN. L.J. 39, 40 (2020).
265
Id. at 41.
266
Lin Shin-Rou (林欣柔), FangYi? FangYi? JiBing JianCe JieChuJhe JhueiZong
yu GeRen ZihSyun YinSih jhih PingHeng (防疫？妨疫？疾病監測、接觸者追蹤與個人
資訊隱私之平衡) [Epidemic Prevention? Impair the Epidemic? The Balance of Disease
Surveillance, Contact Tracking and Personal Information Privacy], 387 TAIWAN. L.J. 45,
50 (2020).
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raising concerns over privacy.267 For technology-assisted efforts
like tracing travel history and monitoring and enforcing selfisolation restrictions to be effective, they must be deployed by
trusted legal advisers. Contact tracing must also be planned with
extensive safeguards to protect data privacy at the outset. Without
safeguards, “individuals may be unwilling to participate.” 268
Furthermore, collecting data in a “privacy-respecting way”
requires “legal, organizational, and computational safeguards” to
successfully manage the remaining risks the population faces.269
As Professor Ryan Calo270 highlighted in his testimony to
the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
in April 2020:
There are myriad potential applications of
technology to the fight against the novel
coronavirus—too many to detail here. Each
carries with it a measure of promise and of
peril . . . does this intervention do enough in the
fight against the novel coronavirus to offset its
impact on privacy, civil liberties, or other
important values? I submit that not all proposed
interventions will meet this simple test.271
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According to this post, The China Health Code application system, which follow people to
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Law. See Ryan Calo, UNIV. WASH. SCHOOL OF LAW, https://www.law.uw.edu/directory/f
aculty/calo-ryan (last visited Nov. 23, 2020).
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The debate over the appropriate amount of governmental
access to personal data should be permitted during the COVID-19
pandemic will continue. Public health, economic recovery, and
personal privacy are incommensurable. However, there is no need
for these goals to suffer at the expense of each other.272
As Professor Lawrence Gostin 273 suggested, “it is
important to carefully balance public health with rights to privacy
and liberty.”274 He further explained that “exercising public health
powers unmoored from constitutional rights is unwarranted.”275
As the Constitutional Court of Taiwan has made clear, the right to
privacy is protected by the Taiwan’s Constitution. 276 Therefore,
Taiwanese legislators and policymakers must consider and
encapsulate these constitutional privacy rights in the rules they
make and enforce, regardless of a pressing global emergency.
They must ensure that partnerships with technology or
telecommunications companies respect privacy when they
conduct data analysis.277 They must also ensure that justice and
democracy are not unduly sacrificed or burdened in exchange for
health and security.278
In Taiwan, the current laws and regulations underpinning
data sharing and surveillance measures in reaction to the COVID19 crisis include the CDC Act, the COVID-19 Special Act, and
PDPA.279 The PDPA specifically is supposed to play a key role in
272
See Martin Eiermann, There Is No Devil’s Bargain Between Privacy and Public
Health, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Apr. 13, 2020), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/202004-13/there-no-devils-bargain-between-privacy-and-publichealth?utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=fb_daily_soc&utm_source=facebook_posts.
273
Lawrence O. Gostin is a Professor at Georgetown University. Professor Gostin
directs the O’Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law and is the Founding
O’Neill Chair in Global Health Law. See Lawrence O. Gostin, GEORGETOWN LAW,
https://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/lawrence-o-gostin/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2020).
274
See Lawrence O. Gostin et al., Presidential Powers and Response to COVID19, 323 JAMA 1547, 1548 (2020).
275
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See Interpretation No. 689, surpa note 178.
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Milano, supra note 268.
278
See, e.g., Danielle Allen et al., White Paper, Securing Justice, Health, and
Democracy Against the COVID-19 Threat, EDMOND J. SAFRA CTR. FOR ETHICS 4 (2020),
https://ethics.harvard.edu/files/center-for-ethics/files/corrected_white_paper_1.pdf.
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CECC Announces Guidelines for Contact-Information-Based Measures for
COVID-19 to Protect Personal Data and Facilitate Outbreak Investigations,
WEISHENGFULIBU JIBING GUANZHISHU (衛生福利部疾病管制署臺灣) [TAIWAN CENTER
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the protection of data privacy in this challenging time. However,
it is apparent the current PDPA is limited, and the need to surveil,
test, and track citizens has not been balanced with legitimate
privacy concerns as Taiwan public authorities attempt to contain
the spread of the highly infectious disease.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PROTECTING INFORMATION
PRIVACY IN TAIWAN’S BIG DATA FUTURE
A. Change the Mindset and Establish a Framework
The above scenarios describe controversial instances
where data has been released to the public and exemplify that
Taiwan is facing a crucial turning point in its open data policies.
Each case displays the lack of a comprehensive privacy protection
program, the current flawed privacy protection law, and the
governmental and judicial failure to recognize the importance of
individual privacy protection. Each of these factors contributes to
a heightened risk of ongoing privacy violations in Taiwan.
To rectify the mistakes that have been made while
implementing Taiwan’s open data programs, government agencies
and private companies must reorient their mindset. Both public
and private sectors must realize that when citizens disclose
personal data, they often have no choice but to give out this data
and retain no control over the flow of their information.280 This
means that these individuals often have a reasonable expectation
that their information will be processed and used.281 Consequently,
it is therefore reasonable to insist that government agencies and
companies should bear the responsibility of protecting the
personal data that they have been entrusted with and show
meticulous care toward managing this data.282 By building robust
information privacy protection mechanisms, the government and
private sector actors should not only safeguard data subjects’
privacy, but they should shield those responsible for open data
programs from potential litigation risks arising from legal
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uncertainties, as illustrated by the Tsai et al. case.283
Instead of downplaying the importance of privacy
protection and viewing privacy protection as a hurdle impeding
open data initiatives, government agencies and private entities
should consider privacy issues at the outset. These actors could
formulate open data strategies at the start and incorporate privacy
risk assessments into every step of their planning – from data
collecting to data processing to data reuses. This would not only
enhance privacy protection for individuals, but it could also prove
beneficials for the government agencies and private entities, as it
allows them to address and solve any future issues before they
arise. Dedicated privacy offices or advisory committees could also
be implemented and would prove greatly beneficial. They could
provide professional opinions and develop guidelines when
agencies or companies make open data policies. The offices or
committees could also undertake risk assessments before
releasing data and could monitor privacy protection measures
throughout an open data initiative.284 For example, in situations
where a government agency must weigh public interests against
an individuals’ right to privacy or when an agency considers what
level of data de-identification is required, a committee or office
could offer more scrupulous balancing tests and more detailed
advice.285
B. Revamp the Privacy Law and the Related
Administration Rules
A set of sophisticated data protection regulations is the
bedrock of a robust information privacy protection framework and

283
See, e.g., Tsai et al. v. National Health Insurance Administration, 102 NianDu
Su Zi No. 36 (102 年度訴字第 36 號判決) (Taipei GaoDeng XingZheng FaYuan (臺北高
等行政法院) [Taipei Administrative High Court], 2014) (Taiwan); Tsai et al. v. National
Health Insurance Administration, 106 NianDu Pan Zi No. 54 (106 年度判字第 54 號判決)
(ZuiGao XingZheng FaYuan (最高行政法院) [Supreme Administrative Court], 2017)
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the key to a successful open data program. 286 This paper has
discussed four issues that must addressed by the current data
protection regulations in Taiwan: (1) the protection of sensitive
data; (2) de-identification requirements; (3) the right to consent
and opt-out; and (4) the ambiguity of “public interest.”
To guarantee data subjects’ right to information privacy, a
PDPA amendment must clarify who bears the responsibility of deidentification between the data controllers and data processors,
offer more sophisticated regulations of de-identification, and put
forth consent requirements for different kinds of data sets. An
amendment must also provide an “opt-out” device to provide
adequate means to fulfill the important right to consent and optout. Finally, an amendment should introduce a more
comprehensive framework and clear guidelines to be considered
when evaluating whether data use is necessary to further the
public interest. This could include a balancing test for when
government agencies or private companies must weigh and
evaluate this “public interest” against individuals’ right to privacy.
With the vast number of public and private interests
involved in open data programs, it is unlikely that a single
provision in the law could cover all circumstances and scenarios.
It would be impossible to enumerate all situations that are feasibly
related to public interests or all methods of de-identification.
However, the law and any subsequent enforcement rules could
still provide the necessary rationales and basic instructions for the
protection of different kinds of personal data.
The global trend of data regulation has been to distinguish
different kinds of data, and then impose various de-identification
requirements accordingly.287 This trend can be seen in the General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) that was passed in 2016 and
286
See European Data Portal, Analytical Report 3: Open Data and Privacy, at 3
(July 15, 2020), https://www.europeandataportal.eu/sites/default/files/open_data_and_pri
vacy_v1_final_clean.pdf. In this Report, it is asserted that Open Data is an important means
of increasing the access of data to citizens, companies, and civil society, and can promote
economic growth, scientific research, and political and corporate accountability. A
successful and sustainable Open Data program should be based on three pillars: (1) morally,
the data publisher should consider the privacy of data subjects; (2) legally, data protection
law must be respected, and (3) pragmatically, public confidence has to be maintained.
287
See generally Mehmet Kayaalp, Modes of De-identification, AMIA ANNUAL
SYMPOSIUM (2017), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/319914283_Modes_of_Deidentification.
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officially implemented in European Union member countries in
May 2018. The GDPR implicitly categorizes different kinds of
data as identified and de-identified data and demands different
levels of de-identification for each category. 288 In the United
States, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA) also creates rationales, related standards, and two
different paths of de-identification for healthcare providers or
those who deal with personal health information to follow.289 After
complying with the regulations to reduce privacy risks, the data
controllers or users can make the secondary use of the sensitive
data. 290 The Taiwanese government could follow suit and
implement a similar scheme with justifiable rationales, reasonable
standards, and a sophisticated de-identification mechanism for
healthcare providers and data users to comply with.
It is never easy to determine whether public interests or
individual privacy should prevail. Other countries and
jurisdictions are faced with this same issue and have made efforts
to create rationales and put more stringent privacy protection
mechanisms into existing regulations as complementary
measures.291 For instance, the GDPR, like the PDPA, allows data
controllers and processors to use personal data for purposes that
are beyond their original collection purpose without obtaining
consents from the data subjects, if the purpose is for public
interests such as “statistical purposes or scientific research.” 292
However, the GDPR also asks member states to specifically define
what the “public interest” is and imposes more detailed

288
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requirements for data safeguards accordingly. 293 By comparing
with the GDPR’s stringent regulatory mechanism with the ETC’s
de-identification process of merely removing license plate
numbers, for example, it becomes abundantly clear that Taiwan
must create a more sophisticated scheme for data de-identification.
This is particularly necessary to create an additional layer of
protection for data subjects in instances when public interests are
found to trump the individual right to privacy.294
Canada’s information protection regulations provide a
relevant example.295 When balancing public interests against the
protection of data subjects’ health information, some provinces
demand that research ethics boards (REBs) assess whether public
interests override should apply to disclosure for health research
purpose. 296 Some even include a list of non-exhaustive public
interests that REBs should consider in their regulations.297 Both
the GDPR and Canada’s regulations show that the balance
between public interests and the right to individual privacy is an
issue worthy of deliberation by legislators, and the tension can
only be tackled by creating more comprehensive privacy
protection mechanisms. Institutional arrangements to help balance
individual and public interests, such as REBs, might be a plausible
mechanism for the Taiwanese government to implement as they
aim to create a regime that better protects data privacy.
Even though open data programs provide several benefits,
these benefits remain hazardous if the programs are implemented
without thorough plans for privacy protection. A comprehensive
293
General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 264, art. 89(1) (“Processing for
archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or
statistical purposes, shall be subject to appropriate safeguards, in accordance with this
Regulation, for the rights and freedoms of the data subject. Those safeguards shall ensure
that technical and organizational measures are in place in particular in order to ensure
respect for the principle of data minimization. Those measures may include
pseudonymization provided that those purposes can be fulfilled in that manner. Where
those purposes can be fulfilled by further processing which does not permit or no longer
permits the identification of data subjects, those purposes shall be fulfilled in that manner.”).
294
See generally Gauthier Chassang, The Impact of the EU General Data
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privacy protection plan would require the recognition of the
importance of privacy protection, a robust framework for privacy
protection, and comprehensive legal mechanisms. It is undeniable
that Taiwan’s government and the civil society are committed to
open data, and their efforts have been recognized. However, to
keep the momentum going in a positive, balanced way,
strengthening data privacy protection is an urgent must.
CONCLUSION
In this article, we analyzed the open data and privacy
protection regime in Taiwan through two steps: (1) examining the
history of open data and the PDPA and (2) identifying the key
controversies raised by the PDPA. Next, we discuss four primary
issues presented by the PDPA: (1) the protection of sensitive data,
(2) de-identification, (3) the right to consent and opt-out, and (4)
the ambiguity of “public interest.” Case studies of the ETC, the
Taiwan NHI research databases, and the recent data sharing and
surveillance practices to prevent the spread of COVID-19 were
presented to showcase both the urgent need to address the PDPA’s
flaws and the Taiwan’s perspective on the privacy perils of open
data and data sharing.
Open data is a way to facilitate innovation. To ameliorate
privacy concerns arising from disease control, epidemic
prevention, or numerous other scenarios, it is important to
understand why revealing exceedingly detailed information is
unwarranted. When the COVID-19 pandemic began in 2020 and
put the global population at risk, public authorities in Taiwan
collaborated with information technology professionals to utilize
open data and keep citizens informed. 298 However, the
government must not employ a “public interest” rationale solely
to disguise or justify inappropriate uses of personal data or
illegitimate surveillance of citizens. Though it is difficult to
balance privacy protections against the public interest, the
Taiwanese government must remain focused on creating and

See, e.g., Taiwan Can Help, https://taiwancanhelp.us/ (last visited Apr. 16,
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implementing regulatory efforts that focus on limiting the scope
and detail of individual data to be collected, used, and disclosed.
In today’s world, combining databases both domestically
in Taiwan and on an international scale can bring together
extensive amounts of individuals’ data.299 Therefore, this article
suggests that, instead of viewing privacy issues as a stumbling
block, legislation should focus on building robust regulatory
privacy protection mechanisms to foster innovation and enhance
open data initiatives and their goals of data sharing. Even under
the PDPA’s current regulatory regime, the Taiwanese population
has witnessed public authorities and corporations misuse citizens’
data and risk their privacy while attempting to tackle a public
health emergency.
There is no doubt that sacrificing individual privacy
protections for health and safety purposes may result in greater,
perhaps even more authoritarian, governmental control and
greater control by technology and telecommunications companies
with undue influence.300 To avoid this unfortunate and undesirable
result, the Taiwanese legal landscape should be reformed to
facilitate regulatory audits and ensure that misuse and abuse of
personal data do not occur when global emergencies, like the
COVID-19 pandemic, transpire.301
Lastly, we offer recommendations for reform. We propose
implementing guidelines for de-identification requirements,
clarifying the definition of the public interest exemption in the
PDPA, and adding an opt-out mechanism as crucial first steps for
299
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reform. Further, in shaping their open data policies, Taiwan should
undertake risk assessments before releasing any data and monitor
privacy protection measures throughout the life of any open data
initiative, including at the outset. Additionally, a privacy office or
advisory committee may be beneficial to provide professional
opinions and develop sensible guidelines. Only by creating a
trustworthy privacy protection system will Taiwanese civil society
begin to feel comfortable allowing the collection, processing, use,
and reuse of their personal data without worrying about an
invasion in their private lives. While Taiwan has certainly hopped
on the open data train in recent years, the country still has several
changes to implement before the track is smoothly followed.

